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STAGING THE FAMILY
CLARE HUNTINGTON*
For many critical aspects of family life, all the world truly is a stage. When a parent
scolds a child on the playground, all eyes turn to watch and judge. When an execu-
tive's wife hosts a work party, the guests are witness to traditional gender roles. And
when two fathers attend a back-to-school night for their child, other parents take
note of this relatively new family configuration. Family is popularly considered
intimate and personal, but in reality much of family life is lived in the public eye.
These performances of family and familial roles do not simply communicate
messages to others. They are also central to the deep structure of family law.
Drawing on sociological and feminist theory, this Article argues that iterated,
everyday performances are performative-that is, they create and then maintain
collective understandings of mother, father, child, and family itself The law plays
an integral role in this by imbuing the performances with legal salience to define the
categories at the heart of family law. This Article terms this dynamic process
"performative family law."
Aspects of this mutually constitutive relationship between performance and family
law are deeply troubling, raising significant concerns for core areas of doctrine,
policy, and theory. First, family law's prevailing approach to defining familial cate-
gories is normatively narrowing because legal actors tend to give effect only to
traditional, dominant images of the family despite seismic demographic changes in
family form. Second, the obscuring effects of the public face of the family often
warp the policies designed to address family violence, most notably child sexual
abuse. Finally, by ignoring the pressure of performance, scholarly debates over the
public-private divide are incomplete and have failed to explain why the concept of
family privacy retains such enormous appeal.
In response, this Article proposes a new framework for family law that decenters
dominant performances and provides an alternative means to define familial cate-
gories and counter family violence. It is not possible or even desirable to eliminate
performativity entirely, but it is important to resist its more troubling aspects. A
denaturalizing framework promises a more pluralistic approach to the emerging
demographic transformation of the family and deeper engagement with the variety
of family life today.
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INTRODUCTION
Ask any parent for a version of the following story. It is time to
head home from the playground, but the child has a meltdown,
screaming at the top of her lungs that she will not go. Instantly, all
eyes turn. How will the parent respond to the child? With bribes?
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Threats? A raised voice? Dragging the child by the arm? Judgments
are forming by the second, and the parent knows it. We tend to think
of parenting as personal and private, but, like so many aspects of
family life, it plays out on a larger stage.
This insight resonates viscerally for anyone who has ever built a
Facebook page or hosted a holiday gathering. Performances-con-
scious and unconscious-permeate every aspect of family life, con-
stantly sending both overt and subtle messages to others about family
and familial roles.' Reflecting sociological and feminist theory, these
performances can be understood as performative. 2 That is, repeated,
everyday familial performances constitute and then reinforce the cate-
gories of father, mother, child, spouse, and family itself. People know
what a mother is from watching mothers perform. Feminist theorist
Judith Butler famously argued that gender is not a natural, stable cate-
gory but rather "a compelling illusion," constructed through a series
of acts.3 This is equally true, if often more obscured, for a range of
familial categories.
This process, in which repeated performances create and rein-
force meaningful roles, is not just a phenomenon on the playground,
but also plays an important role in courtrooms, legislatures, and gov-
ernment agencies. When legal institutions decide whether same-sex
couples should be allowed to marry,4 whether sperm and egg donors
1 This Article uses "performance" to refer to family-related behavior that has a com-
municative effect on others and on the self. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF
SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 15, 79 (1959) (defining performance to include "all the activity of
a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the
other participants," and further noting that both individuals and "team[s]" perform).
Performances can be conscious, contrived, and intended for consumption, such as when a
political candidate takes the stage, accompanied by a warm and smiling wife and happy,
well-dressed children. Often, however, performances are not conscious, contrived, or
intended for a broader audience, such as when a mother breastfeeds her hungry child on a
park bench. For an extended discussion of the conduct that qualifies as familial perform-
ance, as well as a description of conduct that is not performance, see infra Part II.B.1.
2 As discussed infra in Part IA, the linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin defined
performativity as words that create, rather than simply describe, a reality-as illustrated in
the difference between saying "I do" rather than "I am married." J.L. AUsTIN, How TO
Do THINGS WITH WORDS 5 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbish eds., 2d ed. 1975). Feminist
philosopher Judith Butler, among others, uses the term "performativity" more broadly. See
infra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of Butler's work.
3 Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in
Phenomenology and Feminist Theory, 40 THEATRE J. 519, 520 (1988); see also id. at 519
("[G]ender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts pro-
ceed; rather it is an identity tenuously constituted in time-an identity instituted through a
stylized repetition of acts.").
4 See, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104(1)(b) (2011) (limiting marriage to one man
and one woman); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 10-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 2012) ("A marriage
that is otherwise valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of
the same or different sex."); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
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are parents,5 and whether single-parent homes are suitable for adop-
tion,6 legal decisionmakers draw on, and in turn often shape, public
images created through performance. When the lesbian partner of a
biological mother seeks parental rights, for example, courts invoke the
collective image-what Erving Goffman called the "social front" 7-of
motherhood.8 The court compares the would-be mother's perform-
ance with the dominant social front, scrutinizing such details as
whether the mother received a Mother's Day card or picked the
child's pediatrician. 9 If the would-be mother has acted like a conven-
tional mother, then she is a mother, legally speaking. This Article
terms this process-of drawing on dominant performances to shape
legal categories-"performative family law."10
To surface the constitutive relationship between law and perform-
ance is immediately to appreciate its normatively troubling effects.
Performances may vary, but only some have legal uptake, and the law
tends to enshrine traditional social fronts. Moreover, legal institutions
typically fail to recognize the contingent nature of familial categories,
granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-144) (striking down
Proposition 8, which invalidated same-sex marriages in California, without reaching the
larger question of whether the Federal Constitution would permit the denial of marriage
licenses to same-sex couples).
5 See, e.g., Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 475-76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
(addressing questions of parental rights and obligations where two women were jointly
raising children with the help of a long-time friend who was the sperm donor for two of the
children); Naomi R. Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 380-86 (2012) (describing
the numerous definitional issues raised by assisted reproductive technology, such as
whether children conceived by the same donor should have a legal relationship).
6 Cf SARA McLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT:
WHAT HURTs, WHAT HELPs 39-63 (1994) (describing the negative effect of single
parenthood on child well being).
7 See infra text accompanying notes 42-44 (discussing Goffman's work developing this
term).
8 See, e.g., S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (analyzing the
actions of a woman seeking parental rights and noting with approval that she had volun-
teered in the child's classroom, attended his baseball games and practices, and displayed
pictures of the family in her work cubicle); In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 559-61 (Colo.
App. 2004) (describing the "psychological parent doctrine" granting rights to a caregiver
who has established a parental relationship with a child and finding that the woman's
actions in the case satisfied the standard); see also infra notes 181-85 and accompanying
text (discussing these and other cases in which courts have invoked the social front of
motherhood).
9 See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 542-44 (N.J. 2000).
10 This Article defines family law as the legal regulation of families and family relation-
ships, including the formation of families through laws governing marriage, divorce, par-
entage, contraception, abortion, and so on, and the supervision of families through laws
governing domestic violence, child abuse, and the like. This Article does not address the
role of performance in every aspect of family law, and instead chooses several illustrative
contexts. A particularly fruitful path that this Article does not follow, for example, is the
role of performance in the legal recognition of families with transgendered members.
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relying on naturalized images to supply legal meaning." In this way,
performative family law too often leads legal actors to accept rather
than interrogate the public meaning of familial categories. 12
Performative family law comes at a great cost to pluralism and
social change, especially at a time of significant demographic shifts in
the American family. Two out of five children are born to unmarried
parents,13 cohabitation rates continue to rise steadily as marriage rates
decline, 14 same-sex couples are far more visible than at any time in the
past,15 and assisted reproductive technology has opened the door to
myriad familial configurations. 1 6 When the state decides who is a
family and who is not, considerable tangible and intangible benefits
hang in the balance.17 Despite the accelerating reality of change in the
11 See infra Part III.A.2.
12 Unlike courts and legislatures, legal scholars usually recognize that family and
familial roles are not preordained, natural categories. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 36-37 (2004) (arguing
that the social construction of the traditional family, consisting of a male breadwinner and
dependent wife and children, is responsible for the exploitation of women and the priva-
tizing of dependency); Nancy D. Polikoff, The Social Construction of Parenthood in One
Planned Lesbian Family, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 203, 211 (1996) (describing
the construction of parenthood); cf Janet Halley, What Is Family Law? A Genealogy Part
11, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189, 190-95 (2011) (describing the construction of family law
itself). These arguments have had little effect on the law, however. What is missing is a
clear understanding of the mechanism through which naturalized understandings are repli-
cated. This Article develops such an account.
13 The national rate of nonmarital births is forty-one percent. Joyce Martin et al.,
Births: Final Data for 2009, 60 NAT'L VITAL STATISTICs REPORTS, Nov. 3, 2011, no. 1, at 1,
8 (2011). In some communities, the rate of nonmarital births is even higher. Seventy-three
percent of all African American children and fifty-three percent of Latino children are
born to unmarried parents. Id.
14 The national marriage rate is over forty percent, but in some communities it is as low
as twenty-six percent. See PAULA Y. GOODWIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL
PORTRAIT BASED ON CYCLE 6 (2002) OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 6,
10 (2010) (reporting, based on 2002 data regarding women aged fifteen to forty-four, that
twenty-six percent of non-Hispanic Black women were married, forty-five percent of
Hispanic women were married, and fifty-one percent of non-Hispanic White women were
married). Cohabitation, once rare, is now quite common. See id. at 3-4 (reporting that
from 1987 to 2002, the percentage of women between ages thirty-five and thirty-nine who
had ever cohabited doubled, from thirty percent to sixty-one percent).
15 The revised 2010 census recorded 646,464 same-sex couple households in the United
States. Martin O'Connell & Sarah Feliz, Same-Sex Couple Household Statistics from the
2010 Census 26 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, SEHSD Working Paper No. 2011-26, 2011),
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/files/ss-report.doc.
16 See Cahn, supra note 5, at 368-69 (describing the many different configurations of
families that result from assisted reproductive technology).
17 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a)(2) (2006) (conditioning immigration
benefits on marriage); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted
sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-144) (describing a finding
by the district court that state-sanctioned marriage has tremendous societal and personal
meaning).
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American family, family law continues to instantiate narrow social
fronts and naturalized categories.
Understanding family law in performative terms has significant
consequences for doctrine, policy, and theoretical debates about the
family. First, it casts serious doubt on the law's approach to nontradi-
tional families.' 8 The success of marriage equality, for example, has
turned on the ability of same-sex couples to persuade legal deci-
sionmakers that couples seeking legal recognition fit easily within the
social front of traditional nuclear families, with lesbians held out as
soccer moms and gay men as ball-throwing dads.19 This normative
narrowing is also on display in one of the most important contempo-
rary family law reform efforts, the American Law Institute's (ALI)
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (the Principles).20 In a
well-intentioned effort, the ALI's Principles assimilate nontraditional
families into family law, but do so by requiring those asserting legal
rights to act in ways that reflect dominant performances. 21 Families
who do not fit within the familiar and iconic model are inherently sus-
pect and less likely to win legal recognition. Although the ALI has
taken a laudable step forward, it is important to question the means of
recognition.
Second, conceiving of family law in performative terms has impli-
cations for the formulation of policies addressing family violence.
Public performances of family tend to be a soft focus, portraying fami-
lies as rich sites of affective ties. As the saying goes, "home is where
the heart is." This vision may be an important social aspiration, but it
obscures the dark corners of violence, abuse, and power imbalances,
as well as the quotidian emotional slights, misattunements, and ambiv-
alence that mark family life. Family law's reliance on performance
misses the violence that happens just offstage, skewing policy
18 See infra Parts III.B.1, III.C.1.
19 See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009) ("Like most Iowans,
[plaintiffs] are responsible, caring, and productive individuals. They maintain important
jobs, or are retired, and are contributing, benevolent members of their communities. ...
Like many Iowans, some have children and others hope to have children. Some are foster
parents."); Natalie Wilson, From Gestation to Delivery: The Embodied Activist Mothering
of Cindy Sheehan and Jennifer Schumaker, in MOTHERS WHO DELIVER: FEMINIST
INTERVENTIONS IN PUBLIC AND INTERPERSONAL DIscoURSE 231, 243 (Jocelyn Fenton Stitt
& Pegeen Reichert Powell eds., 2010) (describing the "500 Mile Walk for Togetherness" by
Jennifer Schumaker, a lesbian who called herself a "lesbian soccer mom" in an effort "to
create a sustainable link between forces that wish to 'other' her"); Gettoknowusfirst.org,
Xavier & Michael, YouTUBE (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=SeK-_wGyHD8 (depicting a happy, functional two-father family playing basketball and
saying grace before dinner).
20 See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2002).
21 See infra Part III.C.1.
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responses, particularly in the area of child sexual abuse.
Overwhelmingly positive images of family contribute to a collective
cognitive dissonance, as parents and policymakers continue to
approach child sexual abuse as a problem of strangers lurking in the
shadows, rather than acknowledging the much greater risk presented
by family members and friends.
Finally, understanding family law in performative terms sheds
new light on one of the central debates in family law theory: the
public-private divide. Scholars have long worked to undercut the pre-
vailing myth that families are private, standing apart from the state.22
But claims of family privacy remain viscerally appealing, and here,
too, the role of performance has explanatory heft. Families with suffi-
cient means to have private space may experience the home as a place
to suspend performance. Although it is not possible to do so entirely,
the belief that one can take off the wig and costume holds tremendous
allure. When limited-government advocates call for keeping the state
out of the home, it resonates at least in part because of a belief that
the home is, and should be, free of performance. If scholarly critics
and others better understood the instinctive appeal of family privacy,
they could develop more effective strategies for overcoming the false
public-private dichotomy.
To respond to the pernicious effects of performative family law,
this Article proposes a new framework for denaturalizing family law.23
Stepping outside of performance completely is impossible, and not
necessarily desirable, but it is possible to decenter the valence of dom-
inant performances in doctrine and policy. This Article identifies the
essential components of a denaturalizing framework: (1) adopting
broader social fronts, (2) developing alternative means for defining
familial categories, and (3) rejecting demands for contrived perform-
ances. This framework leads to more pluralistic definitions of familial
categories and policies that are more responsive to family violence.
Performance and performativity are well recognized by scholars
in a range of fields. Indeed, there is now an entire field of perform-
ance studies. 24 Legal scholars have fruitfully applied performance
theory to important aspects of identity and discrimination, 25 but
22 See infra Part III.C.3 (describing this literature).
23 See infra Part IV.
24 The interdisciplinary field of performance studies is not unified by methodology but
rather draws on multiple perspectives to deepen an understanding of the phenomenon. See
Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Performance Studies, in THE PERFORMANCE STUDIES
READER 43 (Henry Bial ed., 2d ed. 2007) ("Performance Studies starts with a set of con-
cerns and objects and ranges widely for what it needs by way of theory and method.").
25 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1259, 1262, 1267-79 (2000) (contending that "outsider group" members have to perform
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engagement has been conspicuously absent in scholarly assessments of
the law's treatment of the family.26 This is all the more remarkable
given the centrality of performance and performativity in family life
and family law. This Article remedies this lacuna by developing a the-
oretical frame for understanding the performative dynamic of family
law and providing an alternative to the normatively troubling reliance
on performative categories.
To develop these insights, the Article proceeds in four parts. Part
I provides an overview of performance theory and the legal scholar-
ship that has drawn on this literature outside of family law. Part II
explores the ubiquity of familial performances, identifying the many
ways families perform in everyday life and in popular culture. Part III
turns to the insights that flow from conceiving of family law in
performative terms, arguing that the law's current uncritical incorpo-
ration of dominant performances obscures nontraditional families and
undermines responses to familial violence. Finally, Part IV proposes
their identities to counter negative stereotypes and that "the nature of the work and the
pressure to do it . . . is a form of employment discrimination"); Camille Gear Rich,
Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1158-59 (2004) (explaining that employers develop performance
expectations for certain races and ethnic groups, including specific hairstyles, accents, and
clothing styles). This literature is described in greater detail in Part I.B, infra.
26 When scholars do note the role of performance in family law, they typically do so in
passing and tend to focus on race, sexual orientation, and gender. See, e.g., Katherine M.
Franke, Taking Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1541, 1553-54 (2001) (describing how newly
freed slaves during the Reconstruction Era had to perform marriage consistent with White
norms as a condition of being recognized as citizens). One notable exception is Ariela
Dubler's legal history of common law marriage. See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A
Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 962-67, 1006-13 (2000) (dem-
onstrating that in the early twentieth century the line between marriage and nonmarriage
was far more permeable than commonly thought, that legal norms did not neatly reflect
social norms and instead were a means for imposing judicial order in the face of ambiguity
about what kinds of behavior counted as marriage, that the legal and social conceptions of
marriage were heavily infused with changing gender norms, and that common law mar-
riage was rejected at least in part because it could be reduced to a series of social perform-
ances, thus risking the exposure of all marriages as mere performance); see also Jessica A.
Clarke, Adverse Possession of Identity: Radical Theory, Conventional Practice, 84 OR. L.
REV. 563, 570-83 (2005) (exploring circumstances in which the law confers legal benefits
on a person acting as if they had a certain legal status-such as that of property owner-by
comparing adverse possession, common law marriage, functional parenthood, and 19th
century doctrines of race determination); Marc R. Poirier, Microperformances of Identity:
Visible Same-Sex Couples and the Marriage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTs. &
Soc. JusT. 3 (2008) (examining the role of "microperformances"-the identity-forming
and identity-altering aspects of social interaction-in the same-sex marriage debate). In
other fields, however, there is a closer treatment of performance and family categories. See,
e.g., ROBIN BERNSTEIN, RACIAL INNOCENCE: PERFORMING AMERICAN CHILDHOOD FROM
SLAVERY TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2011) (using performance theory to examine theater produc-
tions, works of literature, and playthings, particularly dolls, to argue that until the civil
rights movement, only White children were understood as innocent).
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an alternative framework-a denaturalized family law-that promises
a more pluralistic response to the demographic transformation of the
American family and more effective engagement with the problems
facing families today.
I
PERFORMANCE AND PERFORMATIVITY IN THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES
Scholars in sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and related
fields have long theorized about performance and performativity. This
Part focuses on sociologist Erving Goffman and feminist philosopher
Judith Butler, whose works are central to performance theory and
supply a useful framework for understanding performance and family
law. As this Part describes, legal scholars have drawn upon perform-
ance literature to gain insights into the legal effect of the performance
of race, sexual orientation, and gender, but they have not engaged in a
similar exploration of the performance of family.
A. Theoretical Antecedents
In the 1955 William James Lectures at Harvard University, lin-
guistic philosopher J.L. Austin outlined different aspects of speech. 27
He contrasted constative speech with performative speech, arguing
that the former describes a reality while the latter creates a reality.2 8 "I
am married" is constative speech; saying "I do" in a marriage cere-
mony is performative speech.29 The words "I do" create the mar-
riage.30 Austin understood these types of speech as overlapping,
rather than distinct categories, because a set of words could be one or
the other depending on the context.3 ' As Austin elaborated, words
have consequence because of the conventions surrounding their utter-
ance.32 The words "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth" are
27 The lectures were subsequently published. See AUSTIN, supra note 2.
28 See id. at 3-7.
29 See id.; see also id. at 12 ("[T]o say something is to do something . . .
30 See id. at 4-6. Austin refined the category of performative speech into "illocutio-
nary" utterances, which "do" something directly, such as saying "I do," and "perlocutio-
nary" utterances, which "do" something indirectly by having an effect on others, such as
saying "shoot her." Id. at 98-108. Although this Article does not hew closely to Austin's
definition of performativity, which focuses on speech, the distinction is still relevant. Some
familial performances do directly affect familial categories, as with a wedding ceremony or
a mother giving birth, but the primary focus of this Article is the effect of familial perform-
ances on others.
31 See id. at 4-9.
32 Austin identified six "felicity conditions," which are required for an utterance to be
performative, including "an accepted conventional procedure" for "the uttering of certain
words by certain persons in certain circumstances." Id. at 14-15. One of J.L. Austin's
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performative only when said in a ship-naming ceremony, and then
only because of the tradition of naming ships.33
Austin's insights provide a kernel for understanding a much
broader phenomenon. Performance permeates daily life and is
performative in the sense that it has actual consequences. The use of
dramaturgical analogies-referring to roles, scripts, and perform-
ances-to understand social interactions is not new, but in the last half
of the twentieth century, the field has developed, taking a more sys-
tematic and constructional approach. 34
1. Performance
A leading figure in performance theory, Erving Goffman's partic-
ular insight was that much of daily life is performed. As he put it,
"[t]he world, in truth, is a wedding."35 Drawing on symbolic interac-
tionism-which teaches that individuals' behavior constructs society
through a particular process of creating shared meaning 36-Goffman
developed the dramaturgical analogy to understand the formation of
identity. As he described in his seminal book, The Presentation of Self
in Everyday Life, Goffman used the perspective of a theatrical per-
formance to study how individuals in the workplace present
students, John Searle, developed the idea of context further, focusing particularly on the
effect of institutional context in conveying meaning. Searle contended that simply
describing a set of facts may have little meaning without a larger understanding of institu-
tional practices. For example, to say that a woman in a dress walked a short distance next
to one man and then joined another man has no particular meaning. But once these facts
are conveyed as part of the institution of the traditional wedding ceremony, the acts take
on meaning. See JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACrs: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE 50-53 (1969).
33 See AUSTIN, supra note 2, at 5, 8, 14-24. As the marriage example illustrates, Austin
was aware of the legal consequences of some speech, but legal significance was not the
hallmark of his performativity-rather, the social convention that accompanied the speech
was the dispositive feature.
34 See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 26-27 (1983) (deploying performance to develop anthro-
pological theory); VIcTOR TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS, AND METAPHORS: SYMBOLIC
ACION IN HUMAN SOCIETY 37-42 (1974) (describing how individuals' actions create space
for societal conflicts to be laid bare and addressed, leading to the restructuring of social
dynamics).
35 GoFFMAN, supra note 1, at 36.
36 See HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD
1-6 (1969). In symbolic interactionism, the self is an object and its meaning to an individual
is mediated through social interactions. See id. at 2, 12. To become an object to oneself, it is
necessary to be outside the self. This is where performance enters. If an individual places
herself in the position of others-thus, taking a role-then she is able to see herself and
develop a sense of self. See id. at 13.
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themselves to others and control the impressions others form.37
Goffman referred to this process as "impression management."38
Central to Goffman's theatrical framework was the idea of the
"front"-that which defines the situation for the audience. The front
includes the setting39 and the performer's "personal front," which are
those characteristics and props that follow the performer every-
where. 40 The "back" is that which the audience is not meant to see
and is where the performance is prepared. 41
Individual performances are related to what he called the "social
front," the shorthand that performers use to help orient the audience
to the general meaning of a performance. 42 When professionals in dis-
parate fields wear white laboratory coats, they can convey a general
message of cleanliness and modernity to the audience without fleshing
out the details of precisely how this particular professional is clean
and modern.43
Goffman contended that social fronts become institutionalized,
making it difficult for an individual performer to alter the meaning of
the front. When an individual assumes an established social role,
according to Goffman, she will find that there is a well-established
social front in place for that role and that she must maintain both the
tasks associated with the role as well as the social front.44 In other
words, the academic must publish or perish, but also wear tweed.
37 See GOFFMAN, supra note 1, at xi. There are numerous criticisms of Goffman's dram-
aturgical approach, including Herbert Blumer's contention that Goffman focused too nar-
rowly on face-to-face interactions without considering the broader social context or other
ways humans interact. See Herbert Blumer, Action vs. Interaction, 9 SOCIETY, Apr. 1972, at
50, 52 (reviewing ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE
PUBLIC ORDER (1971)). Goffman himself was aware of the limits of his analogy. See
GOFFMAN, supra note 1, at xi, 254 (describing "obvious inadequacies" of his model, such as
the fact that the stage presents things that are make-believe while presumably life presents
things that are real, and the fact that in a performance the audience creates a third party
apart from the characters, whereas in real life the other characters are also the audience).
See generally BRUCE WILSHIRE, ROLE PLAYING AND IDENTITY xiv-xvii, 258-81 (1982)
(arguing that Goffman and others use the theatrical metaphor too simplistically because
they conflate too many aspects of the actor and also cast doubt on the existence of a true
self and of reality itself).
38 GOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 208.
39 A person who wants to convey her elevated social status, for example, will ensure
that others see her surrounded by luxurious furnishings. See id. at 22-23.
40 These characteristics are both immutable, such as race, and mutable, such as clothing
and facial expressions. See id. at 23-24.
41 See id. at 238.
42 See id. at 26-27.
43 See id. at 26. As Goffman explained, "[i]nstead of having to maintain a different
pattern of expectation and responsive treatment for each slightly different performer and
performance, [the audience member] can place the situation in a broad category around
which it is easy for him to mobilize his past experience and stereo-typical thinking." Id.
44 See id. at 27.
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Performances of the self are idealized versions of reality, 4 5 but
Goffman believed that these idealizations help confirm the values of
the community as a whole, even when there is a discrepancy between
the performance and reality.46 The performer and the audience col-
lude in perpetuating the illusion of the ideal. The performer maintains
the ideal by engaging in discrepant behavior on the sly, 4 7 and the audi-
ence agrees not to pull back the curtain on the performance. 4 8
To present an idealized self, performers engage in numerous
small deceptions, such as correcting mistakes before the performance
to create an impression of infallibility, showing only the end product
of labor to conceal either the cursory or laborious work that went on
behind the scenes, and hiding any dirty work that went into the per-
formance, including degrading or semi-illegal actions. 4 9 Crucially, the
performer keeps the audience out of the back.
Goffman resisted a dichotomy between real and contrived per-
formances, contending that even "real" performances may be con-
trived-"while persons usually are what they appear to be, such
appearances could still have been managed."50 Thus, Goffman posited
a continuum, with sincere performances at one end, where the per-
former truly believes in her performance, and cynical performances at
the other end, where the performer does not believe in her perform-
ance.5' Goffman argued that performers often traverse this
45 The "self" is a complicated and contested notion. Scholars across disciplines have
long debated different conceptions of the self and whether the self is knowable. See, e.g.,
JEAN PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 82-83 (1943) (setting forth his waiter
example, where the waiter is playing at being a waiter and thus transcends his social
status). See generally THE BOOK OF THE SELF: PERSON, PRETEXT, AND PROCEss (Polly
Young-Eisendrath & James A. Hall eds., 1987) (presenting a collection of views on the
nature of the self, including self as person, self as pretext, and self as process). Some of the
scholars discussed in this Article would take serious issue with the idea of a knowable self,
especially Judith Butler. See JUDITH BUTLER, GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF ONESELF 19-21,
37-40 (2005) (arguing that the self is always partially hidden, "not only because the body
has a formative history that remains irrecoverable by reflection, but because primary rela-
tions are formative in ways that produce a necessary opacity in our understanding of our-
selves"). In describing different conceptions of the self, this Article acknowledges the
impossibility of ever fully knowing the self-of having an irreducibly authentic identity-
but it also assumes that it is possible to divine a sense of self, at least as a felt experience if
not an absolute truth.
46 See GOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 35-36.
47 See id. at 41 ("[I]n this way the performer is able to forgo his cake and eat it too.").
48 See id. at 229-33 (setting forth the numerous ways audience members collude in
maintaining the illusion of the performance, including not insisting on seeing the "back,"
pretending not to see any slips in the performance that would reveal the discrepancy
between performance and reality, and so on).
49 See id. at 43-46.
50 Id. at 71.
51 Id. at 17-18.
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continuum. An individual may begin with a cynical performance but
ultimately come to believe it, or conversely, begin by believing the
performance to be true but then lose such faith over time.52
Finally, Goffman was interested in the ways performances define
membership and exclude others. For example, he noted that even
though pharmacists do not require extensive training, sustaining the
performance of elaborate graduate training is a way of maintaining
pharmacists' social and economic status.53 In this way, performances
can define who is "in," but also, crucially, who is "out."
2. Performativity
The consequence of performance is what some scholars call
performativity. 54 This can be narrow in the Austinian sense of a
speech act but can also be much broader in the sense that perform-
ances create social categories. A foundational scholar in this vein is
Judith Butler, who studies the social construction of gender identity.
According to Butler, gender is socially constructed through a series of
performative, iterative acts.5 5 To Butler, "bodily gestures, movements,
and enactments of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding
gendered self."56 The performance is so convincing that both the
52 Id. at 19-21.
53 See id. at 46.
54 The exact relationship between performativity and performance remains contested.
See Andrew Parker & Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Introduction to PERFORMATIVITY AND
PERFORMANCE 2 (Andrew Parker & Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick eds., 1995) (noting that the
word "performative," despite being a "common lexical . .. term," can have vastly different
and even oppositional meanings in different contexts).
55 See JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX"
2 (1993) [hereinafter BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER] (discussing "the reiterative and cita-
tional practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names"); Butler, supra note
3, at 519 (outlining an idea of gender as "an identity instituted through a stylized repetition
of acts"); see also BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER, supra, at 12 ("Performativity is thus not
a singular 'act,' for it is always a reiteration of a norm or set of norms, and to the extent
that it acquires an act-like status in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the conventions
of which it is a repetition."). For more discussion of this theory, see generally JUDITH
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990) [herein-
after BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE]. Jacques Derrida also explored this broader under-
standing of performative acts and the idea that repeated acts construct an identity. See
JACOUES DERRIDA, Signature Event Context, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 307, 307-30
(Alan Bass trans., 1982).
56 Butler, supra note 3, at 519. The reproduction of a gendered identity occurs through
the reenactment of certain bodily actions against the backdrop of gendered expectations
and bodily styles. See id. at 521-24. Butler uses a broad understanding of an "act" to
include political and social acts as well. See id. at 523. In Butler's theory, the body is central
to performativity. Because biological sex is located in the body, Butler contends that it is
crucial that a gendered identity reside in the body as well, with gender as "the cultural
significance that the sexed body assumes ..... " Id. at 524.
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actors and the audience do not perceive the performance but instead
see only the fact of gender.57
There is, however, some awareness of construction. Butler con-
tends that the anxiety that attends gender performances-when
gender is not performed properly, society is quick to sanction or
marginalize the actor-is "sign enough that on some level there is
social knowledge that the truth or falsity of gender is only socially
compelled and in no sense ontologically necessitated." 58 There is also
the possibility of subversion, as Butler illustrates with the example of
men in drag: Through such performances, the performers "mock[ ] ...
the expressive model of gender and the notion of a true gender
identity. "59
Although gender performances are individual, they are also col-
lective. As Butler argues, "there are nuanced and individual ways of
doing one's gender, but that one does it, and that one does it in accord
with certain sanctions and proscriptions, is clearly not a fully indi-
vidual matter." 60 The performances take on a public nature because
the acts both come from collective experience and recreate collective
experience. 61
In essence, Goffman and Butler both describe how perform-
ances-which are ubiquitous, permeating the self and society in far-
reaching ways-can also be performative, doing significant social, cul-
tural, and political work to create meaning. This is seen in Butler's
contention that gender does not exist in a natural state but rather is
created through iterative acts. It is also reflected in the symbolic-
interactionist insight that there is no preexisting meaning that individ-
uals express, but rather through interaction, meaning is formed.6 2
Goffman and Butler, however, are not an easy pairing, largely
because of their different views about agency and the effect of per-
formance. For Goffman, the actor typically chooses to perform and
the performance has a beginning and an end.6 3 The back is a
57 See id. at 520, 527.
58 Id. at 528.
59 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 55, at 136-38.
60 Butler, supra note 3, at 525.
61 Id. at 525-26.
62 See BLUMER, supra note 36, at 10 ("By virtue of symbolic interaction, human group
life is necessarily a formative process and not a mere arena for the expression of pre-
existing factors."); id. at 19 ("It is the social process in group life that creates and upholds
the rules, not the rules that create and uphold group life."). Of particular relevance to this
Article is the symbolic-interactionist insight that the meaning of a "thing" is neither fixed
nor entirely subjective, but instead comes from an interpretive process; in short, meanings
are social products. See id. at 5.
63 Goffman did acknowledge that some performances are unconscious. See GOFFMAN,
supra note 1, at 6 (explaining that sometimes "the individual will act in a thoroughly
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
602 [Vol. 88:589
STAGING THE FAMILY
performance-free zone. By contrast, Butler's understanding of per-
formance is that the act constitutes the self and thus posits a distinct
lack of agency.6 4 There is no self to precede the performance, and
there cannot be a back of the performance.
Although these divergent conceptions of the self underscore the
lack of a unitary theory, Goffman and Butler are best understood as
presenting different moments of the self. Gender may be a reality only
because iterative acts shape the concept of gender, but in a society
where gender is salient, individuals still make conscious choices, at
least at the margins, about how to perform gender.
Moreover, individuals certainly perceive some agency. The
familiar expressions of "knowing yourself" and having a "true self" or
an "inner self" reflect a perception that there is an authentic identity
that is, at least partially, knowable. Butler and others have claimed
that any perception of an authentic self is delusional, but there are
many times when we feel that we are stepping out of the scene, as
when we may "debrief" with a co-worker or family member about a
worrisome incident.65
Notwithstanding these conceptual tensions, Goffman and Butler
both reflect an important insight into social construction. As the next
calculating manner," whereas other times the individual may be calculating but is unaware
of it or may act in a certain manner because of habit and societal expectations). To
Goffman, these variations were less important than the ultimate effect of the audience
acting as though it believed the performance, in which case the performance can be consid-
ered effective. See id.
64 See BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER, supra note 55, at 15 (arguing that her account
of performativity "in no way presupposes a choosing subject"); see also id. at x (arguing
that if gender were performative, this "could mean that I thought that one woke up in the
morning, perused the closet or some more open space for the gender of choice, donned
that gender for the day, and then restored the garment to its place at night," but "[s]uch a
willful and instrumental subject, one who decides on its gender, is clearly not its gender
from the start and fails to realize that its existence is already decided by gender"). In this
way, Butler does not conceive of gender as a role that one assumes, but rather as an act
that creates the subject itself. See Butler, supra note 3, at 528. Butler then addresses the
existential question begged by this analysis: What came before the subject, or who is doing
the constructing? See BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER, supra note 55, at x-xi. She contends
that we can answer this question only by rethinking the idea of construction itself. See id. at
xi, 7 ("Subjected to gender but subjectivated by gender, the 'I' neither precedes nor follows
the process of this gendering, but emerges only within and as the matrix of gender relations
themselves.").
65 This Article thus uses both conceptions of performance-as a conscious act deployed
to influence others and as a constitutive act that precedes any sense of self. To translate this
into the context of families, families and familial roles exist only through performances, but
individuals and families as a whole still choose to act in certain ways to influence how they
are perceived by others. As described in greater detail in Part III, performative family law
draws more on a Butlerian understanding of performance, but Goffman's concept of
chosen performances is also relevant to how individuals try to fit within, and change, family
law's categories.
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Subpart demonstrates, legal scholars have drawn upon these insights
to identify the role of law in performance and performativity.
B. Performance and Identity in Legal Scholarship
Legal scholars have relied on performance theory to develop sub-
stantive insights into identity and discrimination. 66 For example,
Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have developed a theory about iden-
tity performance, positing that although a person's "status identity"
(such as gender and race) informs experiences with, and vulnerability
to, discrimination, "performance identity"-the choices a person
makes about how to present their status-has distinct legal signifi-
cance.67 Carbado and Gulati give the example of African American
women, whose decisions about hairstyles, clothing, and leisure activi-
ties have significant meaning in our race-conscious culture.68 If an
employer promotes one African American woman but not another,
this decision may well turn on the performance choices of each
employee. The employer may prefer the African American woman
who relaxes her hair, wears khakis on casual Fridays, and plays tennis
at a country club, rather than the woman who has her hair in braids,
wears West African-influenced dress on Fridays, and does not belong
to a country club. 69 But, as Carbado and Gulati argue, antidiscrimina-
tion law considers only status discrimination-whether the employer
discriminated against African American women-not identity-
performance discrimination, and thus the second woman has no claim
under existing antidiscrimination law.70
66 In the literature discussed in this Subpart, there is a tension about whether perform-
ances require individual agency. At times, scholars appear to assume that the performances
are consciously chosen. The image of a worker deciding how to perform her race and
gender in the workplace is more akin to Goffman's sense that individuals manage the
impression they are making and is in stark contrast with Butler's belief that gender pre-
cedes the subject. Other times, scholars seem to adopt Butler's approach and conceive of
performance as creating the category itself, as with the social construction of race in the
nineteenth century racial identity trials.
67 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUEs 701, 701-03, 710-19 (2001) (discussing and applying these concepts of status
identity and performance identity); see also Carbado & Gulati, supra note 25, at 1263-67
(discussing the difficult decisions employees face when employers appear to value attrib-
utes that are hard to observe-such as collegiality-but such attributes conflict with the
employee's sense of self, such as when an employee is shy).
68 Carbado & Gulati, supra note 67, at 717-18.
69 Id.
70 See id. at 719-28. Carbado and Gulati argue that identity performances are particu-
larly important in workplaces where the standards for advancement are difficult to quan-
tify and turn on such factors as "social effort" and "collegiality." Carbado & Gulati, supra
note 25, at 1260-61, 1263. In that context, an incentive exists for employees to "work their
identities" to signal to the employer that they have the desired characteristics and thus
counter negative stereotypes about an employee's status identity. See id. at 1260-63. One
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Legal scholars also have used performance theory to help under-
stand the social construction of race.7 ' A legal history of nineteenth-
century racial identity trials demonstrates the performative aspect of
race. 72 The issue of racial identity arose in different contexts, such as
whether a slave should be set free or whether a person could legally
inherit or devise property, a right that only Whites could exercise. 73
The trials embodied twin anxieties of the time: the fear that a White
person might be enslaved and the fear that a Black person might be
"passing" as White.74 The trial did not turn simply on ancestry.
Instead, parties litigating racial identity introduced evidence about the
physical appearance of the person in question and about the conduct
of the person.75 If a person acted in a way that was understood as
White or Black, then a jury was more likely to determine that the
person was White or Black.76 To "act White" had a specific meaning.
For men, it meant civic participation, such as voting or sitting on a
jury, and for women, it meant acting honorably, both sexually and
socially.77 In this way, race was performative in the sense that it meant
not just what someone looked like, but also how they acted in
public.78
protection in this regard is that it is not permissible for employers to use stereotypes about
a protected group to make an employment decision. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson
Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that "stereotyping of women as
caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence of an impermissible, sex-based
motive"); see also Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 734 (2003) (finding
that family responsibility stereotypes justified the Family and Medical Leave Act). Finally,
Carbado and Gulati argue that employment discrimination law recognizes neither the tan-
gible nor psychic costs of performance identity. As they contend, individuals incur real
costs from the time and effort it takes to perform, a cost not borne by in-group members
because they are not working against negative stereotypes. See Carbado & Gulati, supra
note 25, at 1279-88. And individuals incur psychic costs from the need to deny the self in
order to fit in. See id. at 1288-90.
71 See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE (1996) (describing how law both shapes and is shaped by dominant social under-
standings of race).
72 See Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998) (examining trial records in local
Southern courts during the antebellum period).
73 See id. at 120-21.
74 See id. at 122, 180.
75 See id. at 112, 132-37, 147-51, 156.
76 See id. at 157-76. Although the ultimate question was the "blood" of the person,
conduct was relevant because of the belief that blood influenced action. See id. at 113, 156.
If a person had "white blood," they would "act white." See id. at 131, 162.
77 See id. at 157-76.
78 See id. at 162-63 ("Race was not only something [the defendants] were, it was some-
thing they did. To be White was to act White: to associate with Whites, to dance gracefully,
to vote.").
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Finally, performance theory is central to the work of Kenji
Yoshino, who draws on Goffman to explore the myriad ways gays and
lesbians "cover" their sexual orientation. 79 Yoshino argues that cov-
ering demands can be understood as a new phase in the history of
discrimination against gays and lesbians.80 According to Yoshino, gays
and lesbians first faced conversion demands (requiring an individual
to deny and change her identity), then confronted passing demands
(allowing a person to retain that identity if she kept it secret, as was
true under the "don't ask, don't tell" policy), and now encounter cov-
ering demands (acknowledging the identity but requiring a person not
to "flaunt" that part of herself).81
Covering can apply to other identity performances as well, such
as race and gender,82 as exemplified by a telling anecdote Yoshino
relates about covering gender. When a female law student who is also
a parent asked for advice about an upcoming clerkship interview, a
professor cautioned, "don't front the kid to the judge."8 3 The demand
of the law student was not that she become a man or pass herself off
as a man, but rather that she cover her gender and act more like one
cultural image of a man, which is to say, someone without significant
childcare responsibilities.
Yoshino uses his insights into covering to argue that the law
should move away from a norm of group-based equality because this
approach essentializes certain traits and assumes that they are central
to that group.84 Instead, Yoshino argues, civil rights law should be
based on a universal right of elaborating a true, individual identity.85
79 See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN AsSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS
(2006). Goffman first coined the term "covering" to describe the process an individual uses
to downplay a stigmatized part of her identity. See ERVING GoFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON
THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 102-04 (1963). In Yoshino's words, covering "is
to tone down a disfavored identity to fit into the mainstream." YosHINO, supra, at ix.
80 See YOSHINO, supra note 79, at 19.
81 See YOSHINo, supra note 79, at 17-19. Yoshino's conception of performance envi-
sions considerable agency, with individuals choosing whether to flaunt or cover, depending
on the context. See, e.g., id. at 76-77 (describing fights with his boyfriend about "how to
perform our gayness" and describing debates in the gay community about "act[ing]
straight").
82 See id. at 111-64. Yoshino argues that "[e]veryone covers" and that this phenomenon
is not limited to those in protected categories. See id. at ix; see also id. at 24-25 (acknowl-
edging that straight White men also cover, concealing, for example, depression, shyness, or
socioeconomic background).
83 See id. at 143. Consciously or not, the law professor was using Goffman's terms of
front and back. The demand of the law student was to keep the child and, more impor-
tantly, the student's identity as a mother, backstage.
84 See id. at 189.
85 See id.
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In this literature on law and performance, scholars are careful to
note that race, class, gender, and sexual orientation are not discrete
performances. 8 6 Instead, these categories intersect to require and pro-
duce unique performances. An African American man, for example,
may face fears that he is a physical and sexual threat, leading some to
act in deliberate ways. The journalist and writer Brent Staples
explains that as a tall African American male, he will whistle Vivaldi
as he walks down a city street at night, reassuring White passersby
that he is not a threat.87 And class affects all performances. African
Americans who have grown up in the middle class, for example, can
recount the demands to act differently from lower-income African
Americans.88
Familial status and familial roles are no less social identities than
race and gender, and yet scholars have not examined the role of per-
formance in family law.89 As the remainder of this Article demon-
strates, performance is a pervasive phenomenon in the context of the
family, with significant consequences for the law. Indeed, perhaps
more so than any other area of the law, performances are central to
the conception and functioning of family law.
86 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991) (arguing that iden-
tity politics often "conflate[] or ignore[] intragroup differences," and using the example of
violence against women to demonstrate the dangers of using only race or gender as salient
categories without also analyzing "other dimensions of their identit[y]"); see also HANEY
LoPEZ, supra note 71, at xiii ("Race exists alongside a multitude of social identities that
shape and are themselves shaped by the way in which race is given meaning. We live race
through class, religion, nationality, gender, sexual identity, and so on.").
87 Brent Staples, Black Men and Public Space, HARPER'S, Dec. 1986, at 19, 20. Or an
Asian American man may contend with the perception that he is effeminate. See Robert S.
Chang & Adrienne D. Davis, An Epistolary Exchange: Making Up Is Hard to Do: Race!
Gender/Sexual Orientation in the Law School Classroom, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1,
11-16, 29-31 (2010) (discussing the stereotype that Asian American males are effeminate
math experts who lack sexual prowess and exploring how this played out in the classroom
as students assumed Chang was gay).
88 Angela Harris and Leslie Espinoza have described the combination of race and class
demands for African Americans, recounting that "[miany of us who grew up in middle
class, 'respectable' African-American homes can recall being told by parents or other rela-
tives to stop 'acting colored."' Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing
the Tar-Baby-LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 499, 517
(1998). The authors relate that "[tJhe image we were all fleeing was the image of the n[_],
the lower-class Black person who talked too loudly in 'Black English,' laughed too heartily,
and was vulgar in appearance, word, and deed." Id.
89 But see supra note 26 (noting that some scholars have examined the role of perform-
ance in family life but have focused on race, sexual orientation, and gender).
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II
FAMILY PICTURES
Much of family life takes place on a stage, with individuals per-
forming specific roles, such as mother or son. Groups also perform the
category of "family" itself, where the collective identity is the relevant
role. From the subway to the office to the Thanksgiving table, these
acts are performative in the Butlerian sense of constituting social cate-
gories with significant cultural meaning and relevance. The perform-
ances also shape the social fronts that become the shorthand for these
categories.
Before describing these performances and the performative pro-
cess in greater detail, however, it is important to clarify a key term.
This Article defines a familial performance as family-related behavior
that has a communicative effect on others or on the self. 90 The
behavior must have some connection to family and familial status,
which will often be context specific. The decision to wear a scarf in
winter is not the performance of family, unless it is a head scarf worn
to convey marital status, as in some religious communities.91
Conducting a business meeting is not the performance of family,
unless it is a family-owned business. But so much prosaic behavior is
the performance of family, from wearing a wedding ring to picking up
a child from school. Through their communicative impact, these per-
formances, collectively and over time, have a tremendous performa-
tive effect on familial categories. 92
90 Calling this conduct a performance and not simply "behavior" serves as a point of
entry into the literature on performance and performativity. It also resonates with much
felt experience, in which family members often are aware of performing for others. See
infra Part II.A (describing examples of this phenomenon). The scholarship on family law
and social norms does some work to explain the communicative effect of family behavior.
See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1901, 1907-12 (2000). However, this literature does not contemplate the much
broader notion of performativity. Social norms and familial performances are related con-
ceptually and practically, but ultimately are distinct phenomena. Social norms play a cen-
tral role in regulating family life, but the typical definition of a social norm-the rules of
behavior that individuals follow independent of any legal obligation or formal penalty for
noncompliance-is decidedly narrower than this Article's working definition of familial
performance. For example, social norms require a degree of consensus in any given com-
munity. By contrast, the salience of performance often comes from its nonconformity.
Familial performances do, however, help shape social norms, and in this way many social
norms around the family are rooted in performance.
91 For example, Orthodox Jewish women cover their heads with a scarf, hat, or wig to
show they are married. Susannah Heschel, Gender and Agency in the Feminist
Historiography of Jewish Identity, 84 J. RELIGION 580, 580 (2004).
92 This Article is interested in the effect of familial performances on others, and thus it
focuses on the uptake of familial performances. In this way, the Article is concerned more
with the felicity conditions that allow a performance to gain significance than with the
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A. Ubiquitous Family Performances
Family is performed in a variety of settings, sometimes chosen,
sometimes not. A playground is its own theater in the round, Twitter
feeds memorialize family interactions,93 and a simple cookie-baking
session can become a performance for an audience of thousands
through a parent's blog.94 The workplace is another stage for the per-
formance of family. Parents and spouses often choose to display pic-
tures of family members. 95 Some workplaces demand a certain kind of
familial performance. Lehman Brothers was not alone among Wall
Street investment banking firms in putting tremendous pressure on
(uniformly male) top executives to be married and have their wives
act in a certain way. 96 At annual firm gatherings, wives were expected
to hike, shop, and never complain about their husbands' frequent
absences from family life.97 Divorce was strongly frowned upon.98
Family members also perform within the home. When friends and
relatives come over for a family gathering, hosts often clean the house,
put on nice clothes, and serve special food.99 And family members
may perform for each other, as when a father hides his fear and pre-
tends not to be scared of the big spider over the bed. In a less
fidelity of a performance to a family's felt experience. See supra note 32 (describing
Austin's definition of felicity conditions).
93 See Peggy Orenstein, I Tweet, Therefore I Am, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2012,
(Magazine), at 11, 11-12 (describing the ways in which parenthood is performed via tech-
nology such as tweets, with parenting packaged for others as it is lived).
94 See Heather M. Armstrong, Featured Community Question with Accompanying
Wacky Antics, DOOCE (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.dooce.com/2009/12/08/featured-
community-question-accompanying-wacky-antics (describing in intricate detail blogger's
afternoon of baking holiday cookies with her daughter).
95 The calculus may differ for men and women and also depends on the particular
workplace. In some settings, a woman may want to downplay her family (or, in Yoshino's
words, cover her family) so as not to remind others that she is a mother and has childcare
responsibilities. See YOSHINO, supra note 79, at 150-51 (describing how some women
deliberately choose not to display photographs of their children at work). Men, however,
typically do not face this problem because even if they have children, the assumption is
that they do not have significant childcare responsibilities.
96 See Vicky Ward, Lehman's Desperate Housewives, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2010, at 146
(noting that CEO Dick Fuld kept a "watchful eye on his executives' marriages").
97 See id.
98 See id. at 148.
99 In this way, not only adults, but also children perform, both as objects and subjects.
Parents trot out children for the annual holiday card or at social gatherings to show "the
family." Children can also be props in a parent's material world. See Rob Walker, The
Born Identity: Designer Diapers Join the Repertory of Child-as-Prop Tools, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2010, (Magazine), at 19, 19 (describing baby clothing accessories as "wearable bill-
board[s] for parental taste" and designer diapers as "an extension of the well-established
tendency among contemporary parents to treat their children as identity props").
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felicitous example, a family member may conceal substance abuse
from others in the family.100
Popular culture, too, is rife with familial performances.o10 Family
sitcoms are a staple of popular culture, from the iconic Brady Bunch,
showing a blended family steeped in love and understanding (with
those inevitable visits from Carol and Mike to the bedroom of an
upset child), to The Cosby Show, featuring a functional and fun-loving
African American family. And one need only glance at reality televi-
sion shows to see familial performances in their most contrived, exag-
gerated sense. Whether it is Michelle Duggar wearing her fixed smile
and brushing her children's hair on 19 Kids and Counting or Ramona
renewing her wedding vows on The Real Housewives of New York
City, the cameras are always rolling. The families are aware of the
audience and act accordingly, sometimes with the same transgressive
glee Butler identifies in drag performances of gender, and other times
affirming iconic familial images.
Political families are often only slightly less contrived than those
on reality television, although far more may be riding on the perform-
ance than short-lived fame. Family is crucial to a candidate's success,
particularly in presidential campaigns. The conventional political
wisdom is that voters care about the candidate's spouse because that
person speaks volumes about the candidate's character.102 The candi-
date may be on the ballot, but the family is running for office, and
politicians carefully craft the family's public persona, from John F.
Kennedy's picture perfect family, with John Jr. peeking out from
100 After a revealing event, family members will often say they had.no idea that X was
drinking or taking illegal drugs surreptitiously. See, e.g., Susan Dominus, 'Perfect Mother,'
A Vodka Bottle and 8 Lives Lost, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at Al (discussing Diane
Schuler-a woman who drank a significant amount of alcohol and then drove the wrong
way on a highway, killing eight people, including herself-whose husband was supposedly
unaware of her drinking); Anahad O'Conner & Nate Schweber, Driver Said to Have Used
Marijuana Regularly, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 2009, at A20 (describing revelations that Diane
Schuler was a heavy drinker and marijuana user).
101 Of course, it is not just popular culture that takes the family as its subject. Many
classics are based on family dramas. See, e.g., LOUISA MAY ALCOTr, LITTLE WOMEN
(Little, Brown, & Co. 1922) (1868); JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE (E.P. Dutton &
Co. 1950) (1813); NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Brian Harding &
Cindy Weinstein, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1850); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO
AND JULIET.
102 Jodi Wilgoren, The Other Doctor in Dean's House Shuns Politics for Her Practice,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, at Al ("Political experts say spouses often help humanize the
candidates they are married to. A spouse, the person presumably closest to the candidate,
also provides a window into a politician's character, they said, and acts as a kind of
validator.").
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under the Oval Office desk, to Ronald and Nancy Reagan appearing
as the all-American family. 03
B. Critical Reflections
1. Communicative Effect and Performativity
The central defining feature of these familial performances is
their communicative effect, on others and on the self.104 When it is
predominantly mothers and female babysitters picking up children
after school, this sends a message about the role of women as primary
caregivers.105 When an employee displays family photographs at work,
this sends a message to coworkers about sexual orientation and family
status. And when a father pretends he is not afraid of the spider, he is
communicating to his children the supposed invincibility of parents. In
popular culture, what is performed and what is consumed is an ideal-
ized or refracted image of family. And in politics, the images projected
by political families, however dissonant with behavior behind closed
doors,106 speak volumes about the candidate's aspirations. 0 7
103 Political performances are also perilous. For example, Hillary Clinton set off a mael-
strom in the 1992 election when she derisively said in response to a question about
"whether [she] could have avoided an appearance of a conflict of interest when [her] hus-
band was Governor": "I suppose I could have stayed home and baked cookies and had
teas, but what I decided to do was to fulfill my profession, which I entered before my
husband was in public life." HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, LIVING HisTORY 109 (2003).
104 Communication is complex and imperfect in many ways and an implicit message may
be missed or misunderstood. When an African American woman picks up her biracial child
from school, an observer may assume that she is the nanny, not the mother, and therefore
the message that families can be interracial will be lost, at least on this particular audience.
See Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, A House Divided: The Invisibility
of the Multiracial Family, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231, 240 (2009) (describing this
phenomenon in other contexts). Similarly, some performances may be discounted. If voters
know a candidate has been unfaithful to his wife, they may dismiss a calculated perform-
ance of togetherness just before an election. But much family-related behavior will convey
a message, and over time iterated performances have tremendous communicative effect.
105 For an excellent discussion of this dynamic, see Darren Rosenblum, Unsex
Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 58-78 (2012)
(describing the multiple "ways in which legal and social norms configure parenting as a
sexed endeavor," with mothers understood as the primary parent and fathers as peripheral
caregivers).
106 See, e.g., JOHN HEILEMANN & MARK HALPERIN, GAME CHANGE: OBAMA AND THE
CLINTONs, MCCAIN AND PALIN, AND THE RACE OF A LIFETIME 135-42, 166-69 (2010)
(describing how, even after John Edwards revealed to Elizabeth his liaison with Rielle
Hunter, they continued to appear together at campaign events to portray a strong mar-
riage). The Edwardses' marriage was part of the appeal of John Edwards; therefore, the
performance was crucial. The high stakes game was impression management in the
extreme.
107 The absence of a family can be almost as politically salient. After the White House
announced the nominations of Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan for the Supreme
Court, for example, a continuing theme in the media coverage was that both women were
unmarried and childless. See Lisa Belkin, Judging Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010,
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The communicative effect of these performances is not necessa-
rily diminished if the performance is insincere, unconscious, or not
intended to send a message. Instead, what matters is the effect of the
performance on the actor and the audience.108 To begin, a contrived
performance may still be highly communicative, even when the audi-
ence knows of the contrivance. Think of the effect of television
sitcoms.109 And both conscious and unconscious performances can
have a communicative effect. Wearing a wedding ring and the fact of
pregnancy are both examples of performing family. Wearing the ring
is a conscious choice taken by a person, at least in part, to convey
familial status. By contrast, a pregnant woman may prefer that no one
knows about her pregnancy, or she may be indifferent about others
knowing, but she likely cannot conceal her pregnancy in the later
(Magazine), at 11, 11 (using Justices Kagan and Sotomayor to argue that women's ability to
pursue both family and career has increased only slightly over time); Maureen Dowd, All
the Single Ladies, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010, at A27 (describing public speculation about
why Justice Kagan had not married). Justice Sotomayor staved off these concerns by
presenting herself as having a family of friends, former clerks, and extended relatives, see
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N.Y. TIMEs, May 27, 2009, at Al, an
image she affirmed in her memoir. See SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD 229
(2013) ("I have followed my mother's approach to family, refusing to limit myself to acci-
dents of birth, blood, and marriage."). Women in public life are thus in a double bind.
Having children often means losing career ground, see JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING
GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 64-80 (2000),
but not having children can also be problematic politically.
108 See supra note 30 (discussing Austin's theory of perlocutionary utterances-words
that have an effect on others). Sometimes the audience is the self. Consider former senator
Larry Craig, who performed heterosexual family on the Senate floor and in his personal
life by covering his sexual attraction to men. See Dana Milbank, A Senator's Wide Stance:
'I Am Not Gay,' WASH. PosT, Aug. 29, 2007, at A2 (describing Republican Senator Larry
Craig's arrest relating to a homosexual encounter in the Minneapolis airport). If we specu-
late Craig had convinced himself that he truly was uninterested in having sex with men,
then he also performed heterosexual family for himself.
109 Moreover, although we are more apt to think of contrivance in negative terms, it
need not take on this meaning and even manufactured performances can be normatively
desirable. Just as Goffman argued that performers can traverse the continuum of sincerity,
coming to believe an initially insincere performance, see supra text accompanying notes
45-52, the tactic known as "fake it till you make it" has an important place in family life.
See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING IT 220-31 (2003) (suggesting that aspects of familial
interaction involve performance). Indeed, scripts and social fronts can be constraining, but
they are not always so. Sometimes they can help a person transition into a different stage
of life. For a new parent uncertain how to care for a child, following the examples set by
other parents can be an important source of information and acculturation to the world of
parenthood. Parents may "fake it" at first, but will ultimately "make it" their own sincere
performance. The writer Michael Lewis talked about faking attachment, noting that he did
not immediately feel close to his children, see MICHAEL LEWIS, HOME GAME: AN
ACCIDENTAL GUIDE TO FATHERHOOD 75-76 (2009), but that performing attentive father-
hood created a real bond-another example of performativity. See id. at 76-79. More gen-
erally, we often refer to "role modeling" as a positive force, and it is one way to think
about the positive side of performance.
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months. Her performance, then, is not necessarily conscious or
chosen, but it is communicative nonetheless. Finally, even when the
performance is not intended to send a message, it may still do so. A
family living in an apartment building with thin walls may interact
without thinking about the unseen audience in the apartment next
door. The reception of the performance by the listening family is more
important than the intention of the actors.
Performances have this communicative power in part because the
intense fascination with other people's families creates a ready audi-
ence. Whether out of insecurity, the desire to show off, or the need for
a dose of schadenfreude, most parents are deeply aware of the
parenting choices of other parents." 0 Any parent can provide a story
about the subway or supermarket checkout line, where performance
critics feigned indifference while surreptitiously scrutinizing parenting
choices. To parent is to perform. Romantic partners, too, are attentive
to other intimate relationships, examining how couples interact and
negotiate various issues.111
These performances do more than send messages about the
family. As Butler's work in the analogous context of gender demon-
strates, these performances are performative-helping shape familial
categories and the notion of "family." We form an idea of a family by
looking around us, at families on the bus, playground, television, and
in each other's homes. When a mother breastfeeds on a park bench or
at home with a friend over for coffee, she is making a choice about
what she wants for herself and her child. But her act also sends a mes-
sage, even if unintentionally, about mothers. When children watch
family sitcoms, they internalize the performances when assessing their
own families and family roles. When adults watch romantic comedies,
they may know "it's just a movie," but the performance can still
inform conceptions of romance, intimacy, and the place of
110 See, e.g., Sanctimommy Definition: Top-Ten User Submitted Words, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/top-ten-lists/top-10-user-submitted-
words-vol-4/sanctimommy.html?&t=1287166944 (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) (defining
"sanctimommy" as "a mother who points out perceived faults in the parenting of others");
Ayelet Waldman et al., Who's the Best Mommy of Them All?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2010,
7:11 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/whos-the-best-mommy-of-
them-all/ (discussing how modern mothers are highly competitive about childrearing, vehe-
mently defensive of their choice of parenting styles, and critical of those with styles dif-
ferent from their own).
111 See LEWIs, supra note 109, at 11-13 (imagining a dinner party where the couples had
struck noticeably different agreements about who does what in the relationship and
arguing that these couples, once they realize this difference, will most likely no longer
interact socially because of the discord this introduces to the marital relationship).
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marriage. 112 In all these ways, iterated performances construct familial
categories and create social meaning.
For the performance to be felicitous, to use Austin's term, there
must be uptake from the audience, and this usually involves some ele-
ment of convention." 3 For this reason, not all performances of family
are read as such. Take, for example, two fathers pushing their child in
a stroller down the street. Depending on the context, the men and
their child may not be perceived as a family, but instead as one father
walking his child accompanied by a friend. 114
Goffman's insights about the relationship between performances
and social fronts are also relevant to understanding the performance
of family. Performances construct familial categories in the Butlerian
sense, but performances also create recognizable social fronts." 5 The
social front becomes the shorthand for the category, communicating
112 To give just one truly performed example: Mainstream movies almost always portray
heterosexual sex as vaginal intercourse culminating in a mutual orgasm. Despite evidence
that most women do not regularly climax in this way, see SHERE HIE, THE HITE REPORT:
A NATIONWIDE STUDY OF FEMALE SEXUALITY 184-85 (1981), many men and women feel
inadequate when this result does not happen in real life. See id. at 181-84 (quoting study
participants' feelings of dissatisfaction with the lack of female orgasm achieved through
intercourse).
113 See supra note 32 (explaining Austin's assertion that there must be accepted conven-
tional procedure in order for an action to become performance).
114 Cf Rosenblum, supra note 105, at 58-78 (describing the lack of recognition for gay
fathers, who are not seen as "real" parents).
115 These social fronts are both literal and metaphorical. In the literal sense, new parents
may find that it is difficult to act the part of mother or father anomalously because the
front is already set. For example, fathers are taking on an increasing amount of responsi-
bility for raising children. See SUZANNE M. BIANCHI ET AL., CHANGING RHYTHMS OF
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 169 (2006) (stating that modern fathers are more active in the
home, "increasingly taking on the responsibility for basic, routine aspects of caregiving"
rather than just the "easier or more enjoyable activities of child care"). However, some
fathers report the resistance they receive at work when these responsibilities conflict with
work obligations. See Lisa Belkin, When Mom and Dad Share It All, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
2008, (Magazine), at 44, 78 (describing the pushback many fathers have felt in the work-
place as a result of attempting to share parenting equally). For an example of the meta-
phorical front of familial roles, consider the example of the nomination of Zoe Baird as the
first female Attorney General. One theme in the intense media coverage of the nomination
was Baird's ability to find powerful male mentors. See Sidney Blumenthal, Adventures in
Babysitting, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 1993, at 53, 54. In the words of a friend, Baird was
successful in these relationships because she "gives good daughter." See id. Beyond the
obvious (although not irrelevant) sexual connotation is the idea that being a daughter is a
familiar role that can be played in a variety of contexts, including professionally. It is an
important role for a talented and ambitious woman because it is less threatening to be seen
in the subordinate role of daughter. Ironically, her downfall was that she had failed to play
"mother" correctly, and had incurred the wrath of the public by coming across as a wealthy
woman who left her child behind. See id. at 58-59 (discussing the outcry over the revela-
tion that Baird had hired an undocumented immigrant as a nanny for her son, which ulti-
mately scuttled her nomination as Attorney General).
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to others who is in the category and who is not. 116 A woman with a
baby in a sling is a mother. A man wearing a wedding ring is a hus-
band. And a group of individuals posing on the front of a holiday card
is a family. But a group of five adults sharing a house is not.117 Almost
by definition, social fronts tend to be narrow, reflecting the typical
(and sometimes idealized) performance.
Social fronts-and the categories themselves-change over time,
of course, but the way they change is through other, iterated perform-
ances. 1 s When fathers begin to pick up children from school, their
performances may initiate, even if only fitfully, the slow process of
changing the social front of fatherhood, and, more fundamentally, the
category of fatherhood itself. Social fronts also differ from one com-
munity and culture to the next. There is not a universal social front for
mothers or fathers, but within a given culture or community there
likely is a dominant social front.
Finally, family members may deploy or resist dominant social
fronts. When a candidate for public office brings his family to a cam-
paign event, he deploys the positive associations of family and father-
hood. And when a mother decides not to talk about her children over
the water cooler at work, she resists the equation of women with
motherhood. But in both instances, the performances are part of the
performative process, reaffirming and sometimes slowly altering social
fronts.
116 See supra text accompanying note 53 (describing the exclusionary work of social
fronts).
117 Although courts typically do not recognize groups of unrelated individuals living
together as a family, there are exceptions, particularly when the group acts like a family,
sharing expenses and the responsibilities of cooking and cleaning. See, e.g., Borough of
Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888, 893-95 (N.J. 1990) (establishing a definition of family
that makes no explicit distinction between related and unrelated individuals).
118 As Goffman argues, performances help define membership in a group, see supra text
accompanying note 53, and through this exclusionary work, performances simultaneously
evoke and reflect anxiety about boundaries and larger cultural issues, such as proper
gender roles. Debates about the proper role for mothers and fathers are really a tug of war
over gender. The intense competitiveness around parenting in general, and mothering in
particular, is about the value of these roles and the choices made within them, with
mothers quick to chastise each other as a means of elevating their own choices.
There are numerous other insights from applying Goffman's work to familial perform-
ances. For example, Goffman argued that idealized performances can play an important
role in reinforcing community values. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48. This can
be true, too, with family life. Domestic violence may occur largely behind closed doors,
with negative implications for the perception of the problem, see infra notes 214, 232, but
this idealized performance of family helps reinforce the important message that violence
has no place in the family.
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2. Intersectionality
Familial performances inevitably interact with other socially
salient aspects of identity, which in turn overlap with each other.
Much of what gives heft to familial roles, and also makes them more
fraught, is the connection with race, gender, sexual orientation, and
class. The scene of an executive's wife hosting a party rings true (and
also grates) because of the contested role of women in our society.
The image of President Barack Obama's seemingly perfect family is
powerful precisely because it contrasts so sharply with a cultural nar-
rative about irresponsible Black fathers. 119 In this way, the perform-
ance of family can only be understood in context. Motherhood, for
example, has a hallowed place in American culture,120 but this is not
true for all mothers. The single, low-income, African American
mother-the "welfare queen"-is an object of continued derision. 121
To play out the intersection of family with gender, race, and class,
return to the performance of two men pushing a stroller down the
street. Assuming that observers understand the men and the child to
be a family, the basic family message is that a same-sex couple can be
a family. More precisely, however, the performance sends the message
that two men can be caregivers, in spite of a societal association with
women and caregiving. Similarly, if one or both of the men are
119 The performance of family by politicians exemplifies a gender differential. A male
candidate for public office can deploy his family publicly as an asset, typically to humanize
himself, whereas a female candidate's family may be perceived as a liability. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Martin, Sarah Palin Is Wreaking Havoc on the Campaign Trail, GOP Sources
Say, POLITICO (Oct. 21, 2010, 4:49 AM), www.politico.com/news/stories/1010/43936.htm
(discussing the GOP's difficulties in booking Palin for campaign events and noting that
Palin has "certain responsibilities that other major figures in the Republican party don't
have-in her case, five kids, one of whom is very young").
120 Wiktionary, for example, defines "motherhood and apple pie" as "[p]rinciples or
values with which few disagree." Motherhood and Apple Pie Definition, WIKTIONARY,
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/motherhood-and-apple-pie (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
121 In the 2012 presidential election, for example, the Republican candidate Mitt
Romney ran a political advertisement claiming that President Obama had eviscerated wel-
fare reform by dropping work requirements. See Mitt Romney, Long History, YouTUBE
(Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j79YAlrRiWM. As commentators
quickly noted, both the claim itself and the visual imagery in the advertisement-which
shows only White people working and repeatedly shows President Obama's face-evoked
the cultural script of Whites as industrious and African Americans as lazy. See, e.g., Callum
Borchers, Points Amiss in Romney's Ads on Welfare, BosTON GLOBE, Aug. 17, 2012, at A2
(quoting analyses of the advertisement by numerous commentators). This script is encapsu-
lated in President Reagan's use of the term "welfare queen." See Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr.,
The 'Welfare Queen' Experiment: How Viewers React to Images of African-American
Mothers on Welfare, NIEMAN REPORTS, Summer 1999, at 49, 49-50 (describing the "narra-
tive script" of the welfare queen and its continued salience).
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African American, 122 then the performance sends a message that gay
fathers can be African American, an identity not always embraced in
at least some Black communities. 123 Finally, if the two men are
pushing a basic umbrella stroller into public housing-as compared
with a gay couple packing a Bugaboo into a Volvo-their perform-
ance conveys a message about the existence of gay fatherhood across
class lines, in contrast with the cultural association of gay men and
affluence.124
A performance may take on additional meanings depending on
the overlap of salient aspects of identity within the performer. When a
White man pushes a stroller with his husband, the message conveyed
by the performance is largely about sexual orientation. But when an
African American man pushes the stroller with his husband, the per-
formance takes on a different meaning because of the intersection of
race and sexual orientation within the performer. The performance
communicates a message to both the "Black community," where the
father may face demands of heterosexuality, 125 and the "gay commu-
nity," where he may face racial stereotypes about his sexual
prowess.126 The performance thus sends a message that counters these
stereotypes: African American men can be both gay and family
oriented.
In short, the performance of family can be understood only by
considering questions of race, class, gender, and other salient aspects
122 Interracial marriage is, of course, replete with performances and changing social
fronts.
123 See Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering Covering, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1809, 1819-23
(2007) (reviewing YOSHINO, supra note 79, and emphasizing minority-imposed covering
demands, including the demand that Black men be available for Black women, thus casting
out gay Black men).
124 See, e.g., Randy Albelda et al., Poverty in the Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual
Community, WILLIAMS INST., 1 (Mar. 2009), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/
wp-content/uploads/Albelda-Badgett-Schneebaum-Gates-LGB-Poverty-Report-March-
2009.pdf (noting this stereotype). Although not directly related to intersectionality, it is
worth noting that messages also depend on context. If the men are pushing the stroller
down the sidewalk in a liberal college town, the performance will likely be unremarkable.
If it is a conservative neighborhood, the performance could be highly transgressive. If it is a
traditionally gay community, the performance could be simultaneously unremarkable and
transgressive-two gay men would be commonplace, but participating in parenthood could
be understood as joining the mainstream. See, e.g., Michael Warner, Beyond Gay Marriage,
in LEFr LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 259, 259-63 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002)
(criticizing some organizations in the same-sex marriage movement as "fundamentally
alien" because of their emphasis on heterosexual norms).
125 See Robinson, supra note 123 (describing these demands).
126 See id. at 1819-23 ("Because White gay men establish the norms in gay communities
like West Hollywood and Chelsea, they set the rules of engagement. Not infrequently,
these rules call on men of color to play up the sexualized stereotypes ascribed to their
racial group.").
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of identity. These intersectionalities have important consequences for
family law, as discussed in the next two Parts.
III
PERFORMATIVE FAMILY LAW
Beyond constructing categories with significant social meaning,
the performance of family is legally performative as well. This is true
in the Austinian sense, in which words and actions have a direct legal
effect. More importantly, it is true in the broader sense of performa-
tivity, in which performances and the law work together to shape
legally significant familial categories and legal doctrine.
This Part argues that there are three important insights that flow
from conceiving of family law in performative terms. First, the law's
approach to nontraditional families reinscribes traditional social
fronts-a normatively troubling response to the significant demo-
graphic changes of the last decades. Second, a focus on performance
tends to obscure family violence, leading to ineffective policy choices.
Finally, the theoretical debate over the public-private dichotomy
misses the instinctive appeal of family privacy as a space to suspend
the performance.
A. Performance and the Law
In the most immediate sense, the law imbues certain words and
actions with direct legal effect, as reflected in Austin's example of
saying "I do" in a marriage ceremony. 127 Although the law does not
require parties literally to say "I do," the law does require certain
public actions and then grants legal consequences to those actions.128
The performance thus has a legally performative aspect to it, as act
and word create a marriage. 129 Similarly, common law marriage, still
recognized in a minority of states,130 requires a couple to follow a
prescribed script.13 1 In this way, some aspects of family law are
127 See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
128 In most states, couples must solemnize the marriage through some form of cere-
mony, even if it is just before the city clerk. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-125(A)
(2004); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 11 (Consol. 2007).
129 Cf Parker & Sedgwick, supra note 54, at 11 (noting that weddings typically include a
witness and therefore are theater).
130 See GoRAN LIND, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: A LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR
COHABITATION 8-10 (2008) (stating that Alabama, Colorado, the District of Columbia,
Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah still
recognize common law marriage).
131 See, e.g., In re Estate of Garges, 378 A.2d 307, 309 (Pa. 1977) (describing the ele-
ments of common law marriage, including the requirement that the couple present them-
selves to others as married).
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directly performative-to say something is to do something, legally
speaking.
But performances and the law have a broader, more foundational
relationship, creating, maintaining, and altering legal categories along
with accompanying social fronts. This process remains largely below
the surface, however, and legal actors do not acknowledge the
performative nature of much of family law.
1. Category Creation, Maintenance, and Alteration
One of the primary functions of family law is defining catego-
ries-who is a father, mother, child, spouse, and even what counts as a
family. Some of these categories have a biological basis. The tradi-
tional conception of family, for example, is based on the pairing of
two opposite-sex adults who produce offspring. But the law has never
limited legal families to this narrow definition. Opposite-sex adults
who are incapable of, or not interested in, procreation are allowed to
marry.132 Adoption laws have long allowed adults to raise children to
whom they are not biologically related.133 And, more recently, par-
entage rules generally do not recognize sperm and egg donors as legal
parents. 134
In creating legal categories, then, biology is only part of the equa-
tion. A closer examination of the process of familial definition reveals
that family law relies heavily on performances to determine who is in
and who is out of the family.
As Part II demonstrated, familial performances play a central
role in the social construction of familial categories. But if perform-
ances are the building blocks of these constructed familial catego-
ries,13 5 then law is the mortar. When the law grants legal recognition
to some relationships but not others, it amplifies what would other-
wise be a personal performance and gives it greater sway than it might
have absent legal acknowledgment. This affects the creation, mainte-
nance, and alteration of familial categories and the accompanying
social front.
132 No state law limits marriage to couples intending to procreate.
133 See Joan Heifetz Hollinger & Naomi Cahn, Forming Families by Law: Adoption in
America Today, 36 HUM. RTs. 16, 16 (2009) ("[S]tates began enacting formal adoption
laws in the mid-nineteenth century.").
134 See Cahn, supra note 5, at 387-91 (describing these laws, although also noting
numerous gaps and inconsistencies among states).
135 See supra text accompanying note 53 (describing Goffman's argument that perform-
ances define and police membership in groups).
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a. Creating Categories
To understand legal category creation and performance, consider
the doctrine governing the legal rights of unwed fathers. In the
landmark case Stanley v. Illinois, Peter Stanley was raising three chil-
dren with his partner Joan.136 Peter and Joan never married, although
functionally they operated as a family, living together and jointly
raising the children.137 According to the majority opinion, Peter was
an involved father, taking an active role in his children's lives and,
crucially, providing economic support to the family.138 After Joan
died, Illinois invoked a state law providing that children of unwed
fathers become wards of the state upon the death of the mother, and
the state thus placed the children with court-appointed guardians. 39
The Court struck down the Illinois statute, holding that although
many unwed fathers may well be uninvolved in the lives of their chil-
dren, the state could not presume that this is true in all instances and
instead must allow unwed fathers an opportunity to prove their com-
mitment.140 Eleven years later, in Lehr v. Robertson,141 the Court
affirmed that economic support was the hallmark of this commitment,
holding that where an unwed father had taken no steps to establish a
relationship with his child, and, importantly, had not economically
supported the child, the state could order an adoption without his
consent.142
In both Stanley and Lehr, the Court relied on the performance of
fatherhood, examining the actions of the men to determine whether
they had acted like fathers by supporting their children.143 Indeed,
much of the disagreement between the majority and dissent in both
136 405 U.S. 645, 646, 650 (1972) (noting that Joan and Peter had lived together "inter-
mittently" for eighteen years and that Peter had "sired and raised" the three children).
137 See id. at 650 n.4 (concluding that Peter lived with the children and that he supported
them for all of their lives).
138 See id.
139 See id. at 650 (describing the state's statutory scheme, including the provision that
children can be removed from their homes if they have no surviving parent, and further
defining parent to mean "the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of
them; or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parent")
(quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (1967) (current version at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 405/1-3 (West 2007))).
140 See.Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-58.
141 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
142 See id. at 267-68.
143 See id. at 260 n.16, 261, 267-68 ("The mother carries and bears the child, and in this
sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father's parental claims must be
gauged by other measures." (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)
(Stewart, J., dissenting))); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645 (holding that an unwed father was con-
stitutionally entitled to an individualized hearing regarding his parental fitness before his
children could be taken from him by the state upon the death of their biological mother).
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cases turned on an assessment of the performance. In Stanley, the
majority portrayed Peter Stanley as a regular dad, actively raising the
children and helping support the family financially.14 4 By contrast, the
dissent portrayed Stanley as an irresponsible mercenary, only too
willing to place his children with another family and concerned prima-
rily with his continued receipt of the children's welfare benefits. 145
Similarly, in Lehr, the majority began the opinion by framing the
question as "whether New York has sufficiently protected an unmar-
ried father's inchoate relationship with a child whom he has never
supported and rarely seen in the two years since her birth."146
As these cases illustrate, when fathers act as breadwinners, they
shape the category of "father" and give it a particular social front:
Fathers are men who provide economically for their children. The law
then takes this narrow, idealized social front, cements it into a legal
category-fatherhood-and invokes the construction to judge all
would-be fathers. Economic fatherhood thus becomes the legal defini-
tion of fatherhood-at least for unwed fathers. By transforming a
social front into a legal category, courts and legislatures are not cre-
ating familial categories out of whole cloth; instead, they look for
scripts in the world around them.
b. Maintaining Categories
Just as the law reifies social fronts into legal categories, it also
helps maintain the accompanying social front.147 The newly emerging
rules around assisted reproductive technology, for example, reinforce
the categories of mother and father as individuals who act a certain
way toward a child and who need not be genetically related to the
child. A man who donates sperm or a woman who donates her egg is
144 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646, 651 (describing how Stanley lived intermittently with the
mother and three children and "raised" the children); id. at 663 n.2 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting) (describing Stanley's assertion "that he loved, cared for, and supported these chil-
dren from the time of their birth until the death of their mother").
145 See id. at 667 (noting that after the mother's death, Stanley left the children with
another family, made no effort to regain custody of the children, and even after the state
began dependency proceedings did not seek to assume legal responsibility for the children,
but instead "seemed, in particular, to be concerned with the loss of the welfare payments
he would suffer as a result of the designation of others as guardians of the children").
146 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249-50.
147 Cf. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 103 (1984)
(arguing that law is never "peripheral to 'real' social relations," and instead "legal rela-
tions ... don't simply condition how the people relate to each other but to an important
extent define the constitutive terms of the relationship"). There are interesting, although
ultimately unknowable, causation questions in the relationship between performance and
the law. For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to acknowledge a feedback loop
between performance and law, working together to create and reinforce social fronts.
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not considered the legal father or mother of any child that results
from the gametes.148 Adoption laws, too, confer parental rights on a
person not biologically related to the child.149
In both instances, the law reaffirms that the social front of
parenthood does not depend solely on a biological connection.
Instead, to be a mother or father is to act like a mother or father. In
this way, the legal system maintains the categories it helped to
create. 50
c. Altering Categories
The law also helps alter categories and here, too, performance is
central. The ongoing debate over marriage equality, for example, is
fundamentally about controlling the meaning (the social front) of
marriage. This is best illustrated by the dispute in California, where
same-sex couples are eligible for all the tangible benefits of marriage
through that state's domestic partnership law, but advocates on both
sides still focus on the importance of the term "marriage.""'5 Same-
sex couples claim that only marriage, not a domestic partnership, will
give their relationships the recognition they deserve. 152 And oppo-
nents of marriage equality, many of whom support the domestic part-
nership law, contend that marriage is a unique institution intended
only for one man and one woman.153 In short, as the Ninth Circuit
reasoned in Perry v. Brown, the marriage label matters because there
is no social meaning attached to the term domestic partnership.154
148 Supra note 134 and accompanying text.
149 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7664(a)-(b) (West 2004) (setting forth the procedures
for terminating the parental rights of a biological parent and creating parental rights in the
adoptive parent).
150 Another example is child support laws, which reinforce the social front of economic
fatherhood. These laws require noncustodial parents to provide economic support, but not
time or attention, to their children. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053 (West 2004) (setting
uniform rules for the determination of child support and framing those support obligations
under principles that prioritize financial payments); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 240(1)(a)
(Consol. 2008) (requiring non-custodial parents to pay a share of child support expenses
but not mandating that non-custodial parents visit their children). These parents are over-
whelmingly fathers. See TIMOTHY S. GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS
AND FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2005, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 3
(2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-234.pdf ("In 2006, 5 of every
6 custodial parents were mothers (83.8 percent) and 1 in 6 were fathers (16.2 percent).").
151 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-144).
152 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 933-36, 939-40 (N.D. Cal. 2010),
affd sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-144) (describing testimony from
plaintiffs on this point).
153 See id. at 933-34 (describing testimony from defendants on this point).
154 Perry, 671 F.3d at 1078-79.
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Thus, when courts and legislatures decide whether, as a matter of
policy or constitutional necessity, same-sex couples should be allowed
to marry, these legal institutions weigh in on the dispute over the
social front of marriage. Iterated performances of commitment by les-
bian and gay couples began the process of altering the social front of
long-term relationships. 155 When courts and legislators open marriage
to same-sex couples, this hastens the collective process. In this way,
family law ratifies one performance in the face of contestation and
ultimately helps change the public meaning of marriage.
Loss of control of the social front of marriage is precisely what
concerns conservatives. If the social front of marriage is no longer one
man and one woman, it will be that much harder for conservatives to
pass along their preferred values to their children because the values
are not reflected in the larger community. For example, a socially con-
servative family may believe that men and women have distinct roles
to play in family life and that reserving marriage for opposite-sex
couples reflects and reinforces these traditional gender roles. But it
will be more difficult for the family to inculcate this value in their
children if the social front of marriage does not reflect this traditional
division.156
Advocates of marriage equality sometimes dismiss opponents of
legal recognition by arguing that the opponents stand to lose
nothing. 57 If anything, the argument goes, opening up marriage will
strengthen opposite-sex marriage by confirming that marriage is the
155 This process began with public performances of affection by gays and lesbians.
Simply holding hands in public was a claim for inclusion in the category of romantic rela-
tionships. Much later, as the gay rights movement gained momentum, conducting (non-
legal) wedding ceremonies in front of numerous guests and announcing the marriages in
the newspaper were ways to lay claim more specifically to the category of marriage. Cf
Noa Ben-Asher, Who Says "I Do"?, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 245, 256-57 (2009)
(reviewing JUDITH BUTLER & GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, WHO SINGS THE
NATION-STATE? LANGUAGE, PoLITIcS, BELONGING (2007) (arguing that in the absence of
legal recognition, there is still a role for public same-sex marriage ceremonies because, in
contrast to same-sex marriage litigation, "by performing public marriage ceremonies one
actually starts to take what one asks for," and thus, "these public wedding ceremonies
would be viewed as a demand on the state to recognize these marriages")).
156 See, e.g., Ken Blackwell, Civil Unions and True Marriage, WORLD, Aug. 24, 2012,
available at http://www.worldmag.com/2012/08/civil unionsandtrue-marriage (describing
the dangers of allowing same-sex couples to marry, including the concern that "schoolchil-
dren . . . [will be] proselytized in the early grades [with] the new definition of marriage").
Even if the same-sex couple assumes more traditional roles with one parent doing the
majority of the child rearing and the other parent working in the paid labor market, there
will still be one parent who is working against type.
157 See Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Petitioner Proposition 22 Legal Defense and
Education Fund at 17 n.9, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (2007) (No. S147999), 2007
WL 1335194, at *17-18. Courts sometimes make this argument as well. See, e.g., Perry, 671
F.3d at 1063 (holding that California's ban on same-sex marriages "serves no purpose, and
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preferred site for long-term relationships and for raising children.158
But arguments embodied in slogans such as "Focus On Your Own
Damn Family!"159 fail to account for the influence families have upon
one another and underestimate the battle for definitional control of
the social front. From the perspective of social conservatives, the
Defense of Marriage Act is aptly named.160
2. Uncritical Fealty to Naturalized Categories
Despite the active role of the law in shaping familial categories,
courts often are blind to performativity and instead assume the nat-
ural quality of familial categories and roles. Another unwed father
case illustrates this tendency. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,161 the
Supreme Court reviewed a state law that presumed a child born
within a marriage is the child of both the wife and the husband.162 In
the case, it was a virtual certainty that the child was not the biological
daughter of the husband but rather was the child of the neighbor, with
whom the mother had an affair. 163 The husband, however, was on the
birth certificate and had consistently held out the child as his
daughter. 164
Much of the plurality decision turned on the mismatch between
the various family units in the case and the traditional social front of
family. The plurality noted that during "the first three years of her life,
[the child] remained always with [the mother], but found herself
within a variety of quasi-family units." 165 These "quasi-family units"
included time spent living with the neighbor, who held the girl out as
his child, the husband, who did the same, and also a third man. 16 6
In rejecting the parental claims of the biological father, the plu-
rality embraced a naturalized understanding of the relevant legal
has no effect, other than to lessen the status and human dignity of gays and lesbians").
However, this argument ignores the importance of controlling the social front of marriage.
158 Opening Brief for the Plaintiff-Petitioner, supra note 157.
159 The bumper sticker for sale at http://www.cafepress.com/designedforyou.21312867 is
an obvious play on the conservative organization, Focus on the Family. See Focus ON THE
FAMILY, http://www.focusonthefamily.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
160 This is not to argue that restrictive marriage laws should be upheld, but rather that,
as argued in Part IV.B.1, there is a more persuasive, and arguably less provocative, way to
uphold the right of same-sex couples to marry-an approach that acknowledges the
performative conflict over the social front of marriage but still upholds principles of equal
treatment.
161 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
162 Id. at 115.
163 Id. at 113-14.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 114.
166 See id.
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categories, failing to realize that the categories are performative. The
opinion reasoned that "California law, like nature itself, makes no
provision for dual fatherhood." 167 The plurality thus dismissed the
substantive due process challenge, noting that the Constitution pro-
tects only the "unitary family," and that there is no history and tradi-
tion of protecting a family unit that consists of "the relationship
established between a married woman, her lover, and their child,
during a three-month sojourn in St. Thomas, or during a subsequent
eight-month period when, if he happened to be in Los Angeles, he
stayed with her and the child." 168 Biology was not the deciding factor
in the case, and it is not in this sense that courts adopt naturalized
categories. Instead, acting like a father in a traditional sense-that is,
caring for a child within a married family unit-was dispositive. The
court naturalized the idea of family as married parents raising
children.
Michael H.'s reflexive fealty to seemingly natural categories is
emblematic of an unwillingness to interrogate the categories at the
heart of family law. Rather than acknowledge that this was a nontradi-
tional family that might deserve the same protection as a traditional
family, the opinion simply assumed the force of the categories of
"unitary family" and "father." By judging the neighbor's performance
as too far afield from the social front of these categories, the plurality
was unwilling to grapple with how the categories are not inviolable
but instead are social constructions, capable of change. Further, the
opinion contended that it was simply parroting nature without recog-
nizing that at that moment it was constructing one family as natural
and another as unnatural.
By enforcing the legal fiction that sex does not occur outside of
marriage, the decision reinforced the dominant social front of mar-
riage as a monogamous institution and prevented a nonconforming
performance from upstaging the main actors-the married couple.
The plurality did so in the face of a credible claim of falsity, a claim to
"stop the show." The plurality opinion in essence decided, like an
audience aghast at Brecht, that breaking the fourth wall separating the
actors from the audience would be too destabilizing. Instead, the deci-
sion explicitly reinforced the fiction that wives have intercourse only
with their husbands and that family units are impregnable, as it were.
The decision thus validated the dominant social front of marriage, but
did so in a way that reinforced the false naturalness of the category.
167 Id. at 118.
168 Id. at 123 n.3. The plurality did acknowledge that a unitary family could consist of
unmarried parents and their children but that it was "typified" by the marital family and
certainly excluded the unusual configuration at issue in the case. Id.
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This reliance on a naturalized definition of family is not an iso-
lated example. In Nguyen v. INS, for instance, the Supreme Court
upheld a gender-based classification that made it harder for an unwed
citizen father to pass on his citizenship to a child than for an unwed
citizen mother. 169 The Court recognized that the government has an
interest in ensuring an opportunity for the development of a close
parent-child relationship before granting citizenship benefits. The
Court reasoned that this opportunity is "inherent in the event of birth
as to the mother-child relationship" but cannot be presumed to exist
between the biological father and child.170 As a result, it was constitu-
tional for Congress to require an unwed father, but not an unwed
mother, to take visible steps (including supporting the child finan-
cially) to establish a relationship with a child as a condition of passing
on citizenship.
At heart, this is a determination that Congress is allowed to rely
upon a seemingly natural category-motherhood-and draw legisla-
tive distinctions based on this category. The Nguyen Court did not ask
about the construction of motherhood and fatherhood, or how this
construction might lead to one set of assumptions over another.
Instead, the Court simply presumed the category and the conse-
quences: The process of childbirth bonds mothers to their children.
Men have no such biological process and therefore no presumed
connection. 171
As a final example, In re Adoption of Garrett is a state court case
in which a brother wanted to become the legal father of his sister's
child, which would have made the brother and sister co-parents. 172
The court refused to approve the adoption petition, reasoning that
although courts had extended the right to adopt to both unmarried
and same-sex couples, these relationships were "the functional
equivalent of the traditional husband-wife relationship."1 7 3 The
brother and sister were not intimate and therefore could not be co-
parents. Again, the court assumed a naturalized definition of a
169 533 U.S. 53, 64-67 (2001).
170 Id. at 66-67.
171 Id. at 65-66. For an excellent discussion on why courts may be reluctant to acknowl-
edge socially constructed categories, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Social Justice Movements
and LatCrit Community: On Making Anti-essentialist and Social Constructionist Arguments
in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629, 644-46, 656-59 (2002) (arguing that courts are resistant to
claims of social construction because of the challenges of defining the category with any
certainty but further noting that this is less true if there is a "tangible distinguishing fea-
ture" that helps define the category).
172 In re Adoption of Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (Surr. Ct. 2007).
173 Id. at 732.
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familial category-sexual relations as the basis for shared
parenthood-and imposed this on all would-be parents.
As these examples illustrate, Butler's insight about the force of
performances carries great weight in the legal context. Performances
may be broadly constructive, but the law is particularly constitutive in
privileging one set of performances as natural.
B. Normative Narrowing
The central concern with performative family law is that the law
tends to draw on, and reinforce, idealized performances and dominant
social fronts. 174 This process assumes the essential value of the tradi-
tional performance and reaffirms and reinscribes iconic images of
family. In this way, performative family law is not a neutral phenom-
enon. Instead, the constitutive relationship between performance and
law undermines pluralism, which is particularly problematic in light of
recent demographic changes in the American family.
1. Obscuring Nontraditional Families
The normative narrowing of performative family law is omni-
present, but it particularly affects those outside the marital family. In
determining whether a nonmarital family should be treated as a legal
family, for example, courts often engage in what amounts to an assess-
ment of whether the family is a "real" family-that is, whether it suffi-
ciently reflects the dominant social front. In the context of marriage
equality, when courts and legislatures entertain the expansion of mar-
riage to same-sex couples, they ask, in effect, whether same-sex
couples are enough like opposite-sex couples that they deserve the
right to marry.
Advocates of marriage equality understand this relationship
between law and performance and so consciously deploy images of
same-sex couples that are very close to the prevailing social front.
Lesbians and gay men are portrayed as long-term committed partners
and parents who seek nothing more than normalcy.17 5 These are
familiar types, easily recognizable to the audience. In test-case litiga-
tion, lawyers carefully select plaintiffs who have been together for a
174 As discussed below, a performative family law need not draw upon narrow, domi-
nant social fronts. For performances to have uptake, they must have some element of con-
vention, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text, but the law could draw on an array
of performances. Part IV.A develops this possibility in greater detail.
175 See supra note 19 (describing examples of this strategy, used by advocates of mar-
riage equality and the Iowa Supreme Court, to explain why same-sex couples would be
allowed to marry).
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long period to illustrate that same-sex relationships are stable. 176
Although it is difficult to establish definitively as a causal matter, the
increasing support for same-sex marriage' 77 is some indication that
increased visibility, and especially increased visibility of same-sex
couples playing familiar roles, is leading to increased acceptance.
It is precisely this kind of conformity to familiar family roles that
concerns scholars such as Katherine Franke. She argues that the legal
recognition of same-sex marriage risks bringing same-sex relationships
within the constraints of heterosexual relationships and further
marginalizing a conception of intimacy and desire not based on mar-
riage.178 She contends that both the decision in Lawrence v. Texas,' 79
and the gay rights movement's response to it, reflect a narrow concep-
tion of liberty as residing within the domestic sphere; neither the deci-
sion nor the gay rights movement envisions a broad view of sexual
liberty that would embrace non-normative visions of sex, sexuality,
and relationships.1 8 0 In this way, marriage equality can be understood
as a conservative movement at its core, with same-sex couples asking
for the attendant obligations and one-size-fits-all approach of
marriage.
The same normative narrowing concern attends familial roles.
One of the main goals and purposes of family law is to regulate the
behavior of family members. By delineating clear categories and then
specifying how a person should act in each role-parents do X,
spouses do Y-family law writes the script for much of family life. The
laws of marriage and divorce specify how spouses and ex-spouses
should act toward each other, and laws setting forth parental responsi-
bilities establish what parents should do for their children. This gui-
dance may be helpful in some circumstances, but regulation can
176 See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 933 (N.D. Cal. 2010), affd
sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-144) (quoting the testimony of one of
the plaintiffs: "I'm a 45-year-old woman. I have been in love with a woman for 10 years
and I don't have a word to tell anybody about that").
177 See, e.g., Damla Ergun, Strong Support for Gay Marriage Now Exceeds Strong
Opposition, ABC NEWS (May 23, 2012, 12:01 A.M.), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/
2012/05/strong-support-for-gay-marriage-now-exceeds-strong-opposition/ (reviewing
recent polling data and finding that "53 percent of Americans say gay marriage should be
legal . . . up from 36 percent in just 2006").
178 See Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2688-89
(2008) (arguing that marriage equality advocacy risks "denigrating or shrinking an affective
sexual liberty outside of marriage").
179 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating as a due process violation a Texas statute that
criminalized certain sexual conduct between members of the same sex).
180 See Katherine M. Franke, Commentary, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v.
Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1415-25 (2004).
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quickly become oppressive, requiring conformity in the most personal
aspects of our lives.
For traditional families, there is considerable leeway in the per-
formance.181 The law demands a ritual performance, such as a wed-
ding ceremony or a birth certificate signing. In exchange, the state
generally does not critique the details of family members' perform-
ances, at least until some crisis emerges or the intact family breaks up.
By contrast, to gain legal recognition, nontraditional families
must closely follow a prescribed script of how families are supposed to
act. In cases where functional mothers seek legal recognition, for
example, courts sometimes examine such minutiae as whether a
would-be mother helped select a pediatrician and day care center,182
volunteered in a child's classroom, 183 or drove a child to sports prac-
tice and games.18 4 Legal rights are granted only after a searching
review of the individual's performance to ensure consistency with the
prevailing social front. Moreover, this dominant social front is often
an idealized image of family. A legal family may eschew Mother's Day
as an overly commercialized Hallmark holiday or may simply forget to
celebrate it. But the failure to honor a functional mother on Mother's
Day can become a point of evidence in a trial about whether to confer
parental rights. 8 5
2. Scrutinizing Marginal Families
The normative narrowing of performative family law has
profound effects on the regulation of marginal families-particularly
low-income, non-White families. The dominant social front of family
historically in the United States has been nuclear, economically stable,
patriarchal, heterosexual, and White. 186 Families that do not fit this
181 See Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1199, 1203-06 (2010) (describing her prior work developing the argu-
ment that marriage is far less constricting than domestic partnerships because the former
requires only the entry ritual, leaving married couples free to organize their sexual, social,
and financial lives as they choose; by contrast, the recognition of a domestic partnership
turns on conformity with norms such as cohabitation, monogamy, and economic sharing).
182 E.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 543 (N.J. 2000); In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 550
(Colo. App. 2004).
183 E.g., S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2011).
184 E.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d 271, 274 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
185 L.M.S. v. C.M.G., No. CN04-08601, 2006 WL 5668820, at *10 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 27,
2006). Cf S.Y., 134 Cal. Rptr. at 6 (noting that the plaintiff was celebrated on Mother's
Day).
186 See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the
Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299, 309-12 (2002) (explaining the
dominant historical norms of masculinity and fatherhood and noting that family law
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social front are in a more precarious position, susceptible to greater
scrutiny by the state. In the late nineteenth century, for example,
White, upper class men and women established and ran child protec-
tion societies to "save" abused and neglected children from their
largely poor, immigrant parents.187 But instead of looking objectively
at a child's health and safety, these "child savers" judged home life
using White, upper-class norms. 88 Child savers, horrified by immi-
grants' use of garlic in cooking and their habit of drinking wine with
dinner, were repulsed by their clients' home lives.189 The child welfare
system is the modern day version of this imposition of White, middle-
class norms, with low-income children of color removed from their
homes at far greater rates than similarly situated White children.190
Another aspect of this dynamic is that marginalized families have
less influence on the construction of legal categories. Some perform-
ances simply count more than others. The performance of a single,
African American mother receiving state aid, for example, has little
uptake in the construction of the dominant social front of mother-
hood. Instead, it becomes the social front for deviant mothers.' 9' This
is primarily a result of power, class, and race, but those dynamics
amplify or mute performances that might otherwise be received
unmediated.
C. Implications
Conceiving of family law in performative terms leads to three
central insights. First, it casts serious doubt on the law's recent
attempts to address the deep demographic changes of the past few
interventions in the nineteenth century centered on changing the behavior of families that
did not meet these norms).
187 See LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE PoLITICS AND HISTORY OF
FAMILY VIOLENCE 8, 14-15 (1988) (describing major child protection agencies in Boston in
the late nineteenth century and the common characteristics of their workers and clients).188 For example, one of the primary bases for removing children was the determination
that the father was not able to provide financially for the entire family and that the mother
and children were in the labor force. See Hasday, supra note 186, at 332 (explaining that
child protection workers saw poverty, and the attendant requirement for children to work,
as representing moral vices of parents).
189 See GORDON, supra note 187, at 46-47 (explaining the importance of the "cultural
lenses" through which child protectors viewed their clients).
190 See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 192-93
(2005) (arguing that the modern child welfare system still reflects a class-based orienta-
tion); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 47-55
(2002) (describing evidence of race and class bias in the child welfare system).
191 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 203-07 (1997) (describing the historical exclusion of African
Americans from the welfare system and the more modern construction of low-income,
African American women who receive welfare as social deviants).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
630 [Vol. 88:589
STAGING THE FAMILY
decades. Second, it demonstrates that the current policies designed to
address family violence, most notably child sexual abuse, are mis-
guided. Finally, it shows that scholarly debates over the public-private
divide are incomplete and have failed to explain why the concept of
family privacy retains such enormous appeal. This Subpart addresses
each insight in turn.
1. Inscribing Dominant Performances
One of the most important recent family law reforms is the ALI's
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.192 Finalized in 2001, the
Principles are an attempt by the ALI not simply to restate the law
pertaining to family dissolution as it exists across jurisdictions, but also
to provide normative guidance to courts and legislatures. 193 Notably,
the ALI wanted to respond to the increase of family-like behavior
outside of the traditional legal family. 194 Through an exhaustive pro-
cess lasting more than a decade, the ALI reporters canvassed existing
law and debated how the law could better address social needs. 195 The
ALI Principles are intended as a resource for both courts and legisla-
tors to consult when deciding on family law policies. 196
Viewed through the lens of performativity, however, the ALI's
well-intentioned effort to treat alternative families more liberally by
bringing them within the fold of family law looks more problematic.
The primary concern is that the Principles recreate the normative nar-
rowing of performative family law. To assimilate nontraditional fami-
lies into family law, the Principles require those seeking legal rights to
act in ways that reflect dominant social fronts as a condition of
receiving legal benefits. This reinforces the primacy and normativity
of the traditional family.
A core provision of the Principles, for example, provides for the
assimilation of cohabiting couples into domestic partnerships.197 If a
couple shares "a primary residence and a life together" 198 for a signifi-
cant period of time, then they are considered domestic partners.199
192 See PRINCIPLEs, supra note 20.
193 See Ira Mark Ellman, Chief Reporter's Foreword to PRINCIPLES, supra note 20, at xv.
194 See Lance Liebman, Director's Foreword to PRINCIPLES, supra note 20, at xii-xiv.
195 See id. at xiii (describing the process of developing the Principles).
196 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Introduction to RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE
ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSoLUTION 3
(Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) (explaining that the Principles were written for legisla-
tors to use when reforming statutes, and that, given the prestige of the American Law
Institute, courts will likely consult the Principles regularly as well).
197 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 20, § 6.01(1).
198 Id. § 6.03(1).
199 Whether a couple is sharing a life together is determined by reference to a range of
factors, including the extent to which the partners commingle finances, are economically
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Similarly, the Principles confer parental rights on a functional, or "de
facto," parent when the person lives with the child for at least two
years and provides at least an equal share of the caretaking responsi-
bilities for the child, for a primary purpose other than
remuneration.200
Both provisions are a laudable attempt to recognize that families
exist outside of marriage, but the provisions impose the dominant
social front of marriage and parenthood on the would-be family mem-
bers. Take, for instance, unmarried partners who are deeply com-
mitted to each other but who must live apart due to career
demands.201 Under the Principles, the failure to share a primary resi-
dence means that this couple would not qualify as domestic partners.
Their performance of family thus falls short because they do not sat-
isfy the dominant social front of married couples. Similarly, a would-
be parent under the Principles must be responsible for half of the
childcare responsibilities. Imagine a woman with a demanding job
who is the lesbian partner of a child's biological mother. She cannot
provide half of the childcare and so, under the Principles, is not a legal
mother. Finally, the Principles do not conceive of multiple adults
caring for a child, each with legal rights. The Principles thus reinscribe
family law's "rule of two," which limits children to two legal
parents.202
interdependent, "assume[] specialized or collaborative roles in furtherance of their life
together," change each other's lives, share emotional and physical intimacy, and have a
reputation as a couple. Id. § 6.03(7)(a)-(m). If a couple is in a domestic partnership and
later terminates their relationship, the Principles counsel courts to impose the same princi-
ples of economic sharing that follow the dissolution of a marriage. See id. §§ 6.04-.06.
Couples can, however, opt out of this imposed economic sharing if they have an enforce-
able agreement to the contrary. See id. § 6.03 cmt. b.
200 See id. § 2.03(1)(c).
201 See, e.g., Jennifer Conlin, Living Apart for the Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at
ST1 (describing a 2006 report from the U.S. Census Bureau that 3.6 million married
Americans are living apart from their spouses and providing anecdotal examples of this
phenomenon showing that it is largely driven by economic necessity). The most recent
report from the U.S. Census Bureau, based on the 2010 census, shows that 3.35 million
married Americans are living apart from their spouses. See The 2012 Statistical Abstract:
Population, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/
population.html (follow "57 - Marital Status of the Population by Sex and Age: 2010"
Excel hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) (listing 1,756,000 men and 1,594,000 women in
the "married, spouse absent" category).
202 No state allows a child to have three legal parents. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851
P.2d 776, 778, 781 (Cal. 1993) (considering a situation in which three people claimed to be
a child's parents and rejecting the argument that a child could have a father and two
mothers). This doctrine ignores the social reality that some families function in this
manner. See infra note 245 and accompanying text (providing the example of lesbian
couples who choose to raise their children with the men who donated sperm to them).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
632 [Vol. 88:589
STAGING THE FAMILY
Requiring functional families to act like traditional families
places performance at the center of the analysis, entrenching tradi-
tional social fronts and undermining pluralism. This is particularly
troubling because nontraditional families often do not act like tradi-
tional families. Many nontraditional families live in family circum-
stances that are not consistent with the dominant social front and thus
are at considerable risk that their performances will fall short.
2. Offstage Violence
Legal valorization of familial performances and the emphasis on
what others see contributes to a cognitive dissonance about what is
largely unseen. From everyday disagreements to the violence and
sexual assault that mark too many families, what goes on behind
closed doors is not what is seen at the playground and the grocery
store. When the audience does stumble into the back, the scene can be
startling.203
The Van Derbur family provides a compelling example. In the
1950s, the Van Derbur family of Colorado was well respected and
involved in the Denver community. 204 The Van Derburs, who had four
203 For example, anthropologists and archaeologists at U.C. Irvine and UCLA recently
conducted a study of thirty-two middle class, dual-income families with children in the Los
Angeles area. See Belinda Campos et al., Opportunity for Interaction? A Naturalistic
Observation Study of Dual-Earner Families After Work and School, 23 J. FAM. PsycHoL.
798, 800 (2009). For two weekdays and one weekend, the researchers videotaped the fami-
lies during waking hours when they were at home, and then coded their behavior. See id.
Although the study generated numerous interesting findings, one revelation for the
researchers was their own reaction to what they saw. The researchers without children
reported their shock at the level of discord in family life. Benedict Carey, Families' Every
Hug and Fuss, Taped, Analyzed and Archived, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, at Al. One
researcher who was childless at the time of the experiment called his experience "[t]he very
purest form of birth control ever devised. Ever." Id. The researchers experienced the
reality that family life is often unappealing in ways that are surprising to those who typi-
cally see only the front, not the back, of other families' lives.
This discrepancy between the inside and outside of family life can also be surprising
for new parents, who sometimes assume parenthood will be more exhilarating and
rewarding than it often is, especially in the first few weeks. For an anecdotal account of
this, see LEWIS, supra note 109, at 13-14 (explaining that his journal about fatherhood
began because of "this persistent and disturbing gap between what I was meant to feel and
what I actually felt"). See also id. at 75 ("Clutching [my first child] after she exited the
womb, I was able to generate tenderness and a bit of theoretical affection, but after that,
for a good six weeks, the best I could manage was detached amusement. The worst was
hatred.").
204 See MARILYN VAN DERBUR, Miss AMERICA By DAY: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
ULTIMATE BETRAYALS AND UNCONDITIONAL LovE 9-11 (2004) (describing the civic
involvement and status within the community of the author's parents).
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daughters, were socially and economically successful. 2 0 5 The girls had
a picture-perfect childhood, with weekly trips to church and summers
split between a mountain retreat and a beach house.206 Each daughter
excelled in her own way; the youngest, Marilyn, was crowned Miss
America in 1958.207
In contrast to this front, the back of the family was horrific. As
Marilyn related in her 2004 autobiography, her father repeatedly
raped her from age five to eighteen.208 Marilyn wrote about her exper-
iences as the "night child" who would wait, terrified, for her father to
pad down the hallway into her bedroom.209 She repressed the memo-
ries for years210 and never told anyone until she was in her early twen-
ties and a youth minister from her childhood church guessed her
secret.211 A theme throughout her childhood was the performance
involved in covering the incest.212 As she put it, "I began to see our
family as a Hollywood set. We looked like a beautiful picture but if
you walked through the front door of our set there was just rubble and
trash. "213
As this story illustrates, there is often a wide discrepancy between
positive images of family and the lived experience. Although difficult
to prove as an empirical matter, it is intuitive that the disconnect
between the social front of family life and the private back contributes
to a collective cognitive dissonance surrounding family dysfunction.
Few may be surprised when a politician who sings daily paeans to his
wife of many years turns out to have a child with another woman, yet
it can be difficult to grasp the depth and breadth of familial
205 See id. at 11 (describing the Van Derburs' impressive home and their household
employees, which included a nanny, a gardener, a woman who did the laundry, and two
women who cooked and cleaned).
206 See id. at 12-14.
207 See 1958: Marilyn Van Derbur, Miss AMERICA, http://www.missamerica.org/our-
miss-americas/1950/1958.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) (describing Marilyn Van Derbur's
crowning as Miss America and her work since then).
208 See VAN DERBUR, supra note 204, at 21-28 (describing this abuse and noting that it
happened regularly for thirteen years). Van Derbur does not reveal whether her father
sexually abused her two middle sisters. See id. at 12 (noting that her two middle sisters
asked not to be included in the story). She does describe his ten-year sexual abuse of her
eldest sister. See id. at 192-93 (noting that her father abused her sister Gwen from age
eight to eighteen and describing Gwen's reaction to the abuse).
209 See id. at 21-22 (explaining her survival mechanism of subconsciously splitting her
daytime self from her nighttime self, who suffered the abuse).
210 See id. at 35, 192 ("I had no conscious memories of my nights.").
211 See id. at 30, 101-04.
212 See id. at 27-83 (explaining that she masked her loneliness, terror, and anxiety by
constantly pushing herself to stay busy and to excel at everything she did).
213 Id. at 258; see also id. at 259 ("I have never met anyone, who was as good as my
mother was, at playing the different roles.").
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dysfunction. 214 1n many families the back is not simply discrepant with
the front, but rather is wholly at odds with it.215
Take child sexual abuse: Although statistics in this field have
notable limitations, 2 16 there is evidence that approximately thirty per-
cent of girls and thirteen percent of boys are sexually abused by the
age of eighteen.217 In nearly all cases, the perpetrator is known to the
214 Although this Subpart focuses on child sexual abuse, much of the same could be said
about domestic violence. Despite increased awareness of domestic violence, the extent of
the problem can still be startling. A recent study by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention found that nearly one in three women has been the victim of domestic violence.
See MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY
REPORT 2, 39 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/
NISVSReport2010-a.pdf.
215 There are numerous other ways in which the back does not match the front. For
example, the exaggerated performance of traditional family values often masks a more
divergent reality. It has become almost commonplace to find prominent male social con-
servatives in sexual relationships with other men. See, e.g., Milbank, supra note 108
(describing Republican Senator Larry Craig's arrest relating to a homosexual encounter in
the Minneapolis airport); Frank Rich, A Heaven-Sent Rent Boy, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2012,
at WK10 (describing Baptist minister George Reker's ten-day trip to Europe with a
twenty-year-old male escort). These men seem invariably to be married with children and
they uniformly support traditional family values, condemning homosexuality and other
"deviant" behavior, such as single parenthood. See, e.g., GEORGE ALAN REKERS,
GROWING UP STRAIGHT 40 (1982) ("Homosexual activists seek to lure our children into a
deceptive and destructive fantasy world that ignores the obvious physical, social and moral
boundaries of sexual expression.").
216 See DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEXUALLY ASSAULTED
CHILDREN: NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS 9 (2008) (concluding, after
addressing various methodological concerns, that "[i]t may be inherently impossible to get
a complete and unbiased accounting of all child sexual assaults close to the time they
occur").
217 See Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition,
Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, 82
MAYO CLINIC PROC. 457, 460 (2007); id. at 457 (defining sexual abuse as "any sexual act
directed against another person forcibly and/or against that person's will or not forcibly or
against the person's will in which the injured party is incapable of giving consent"). This
Article relies on studies seeking to determine the prevalence, rather than the incidence, of
child sexual abuse. Incidence studies use official statistics, such as cases substantiated by
the child welfare system or reported to the police. Prevalence studies ask a representative
sample of the population retrospective questions about specific experiences. Incidence
rates are notoriously low. See, e.g., ANDREA SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERvs., FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
(NIS-4) 3-1 to 3-4 (2010), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/statistics/nis.
cfm (finding that 135,300 children were sexually abused by a parent or caretaker in the
2005-06 study year). One of the hallmarks of child sexual abuse is that the child does not
tell anyone, and even if the child does tell someone, the abuse is not reported to the police.
See Diana E.H. Russell, The Incidence and Prevalence of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial
Sexual Abuse of Female Children, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 133, 142 (1983) (finding
that only two percent of the intrafamilial cases and six percent of the extrafamilial cases in
her study were reported to the authorities). One study that strikes a balance between inci-
dence reports and retrospective prevalence studies is a 1999 survey of adult caretakers and
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family,218 and for approximately thirty percent of the girls who are
abused, the perpetrator is a family member.219 Despite these high
prevalence rates, only a small minority of victims reports the abuse to
the authorities; this is particularly true when the offender is a family
member.220
These statistics stand in marked contrast to the dominant legal
response to child sexual abuse, which is to focus on the threat from
strangers. Sex offender registries, for example, are intended to alert
communities to the presence of sexual predators,221 but in doing so,
they reinforce the message that the danger is from the unknown,
rather than the known. Similarly, popular AMBER Alerts are
designed primarily to address abductions by strangers,222 again rein-
forcing the idea that strangers pose the greatest danger to children.
The problem is rarely characterized as a threat within the home or
close to the home.223
Parents thus continue to misperceive the real threats to their chil-
dren. The five greatest threats to a child's safety are car accidents,
youth aged ten to eighteen, which attempted to capture sexual abuse closer to the time it
occurred. See FINKELHOR ET AL., supra note 216, at 1-4. This study found that an esti-
mated 285,400 children had been sexually assaulted in 1999 (defined to include rape,
attempted rape, and other unwanted sexual contact involving force or coercion). See id. at
2, 5.
218 See REBECCA M. BOLEN, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: ITS SCOPE AND OUR FAILURE
91-101 (2001) (discussing studies finding that abuse by strangers accounted for only seven
percent of all sexual abuse and describing other types of extrafamilial offenders, including
family friends, acquaintances, and people in positions of authority who are known to the
family).
219 See id. at 113-14. Among family members, the offender is most often an uncle, see id.
at 114, although in African American families, the most common offender may be a step-
parent. See id. The second most common offender for all demographic groups is a father or
cousin. See id. In the case of male victims, the offender is less likely to be a family member,
with only eleven to twelve percent of all abuse of males occurring within the family. See id
at 114. To be clear, then, in the majority of cases for both girls and boys, the perpetrator is
a nonfamily member, although not a stranger to the child. This Article focuses on
intrafamilial child sexual abuse because of the connection to family performances.
220 See supra note 217 (discussing reporting rates).
221 See Kate Blacker & Lissa Griffin, Megan's Law and Sarah's Law: A Comparative
Study of Sex Offender Community Notification Schemes in the United States and the United
Kingdom, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 987, 988 n.12 (2010) (listing the sex offender registry laws in
all fifty states; pursuant to federal guidelines, the laws require that covered individuals
provide law enforcement with specified information, such as an address, a photograph,
fingerprints, a social security number, and information about the conviction).
222 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guidelines for Issuing AMBER Alerts, AMBER ALERT,
http://www.amberalert.gov/guidelines.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) (explaining that
stranger abductions are "primary to the mission of an AMBER Alert").
223 See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MANAGING SEX
OFFENDERS: CITIZENS SUPPORTING LAw ENFORCEMENT 1 (2006) (describing the strong
public demand that law enforcement prevent "violent sex offenders and predators" from
victimizing the public).
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homicide (typically by someone known to the child), child abuse, sui-
cide, and drowning. 224 According to a survey by the Mayo Clinic, how-
ever, parents are most worried about kidnapping, terrorists, and
dangerous strangers. 225
There are numerous reasons for misunderstanding threats,226 but
part of the explanation lies in the nature of familial performances. The
active management of the familial social front by public figures and
everyday citizens alike makes it harder to believe that a father would
rape his daughter or that an uncle would force his nephew to watch
him masturbate. 227
3. The Public-Private Divide
A central principle in family law is that the state should largely
leave families alone to order their own affairs. Scholars have long
challenged this concept of family privacy, and a critical step has been
the argument made by feminists and others that the family is not a
private institution.228 As scholars have contended, the state's determi-
nation of which groupings of individuals will win the moniker
"family," 229 as well as who will receive the state's largesse and with
what strings attached, 230 belies an institution that functions apart from
the law. Further, the influence of laws regulating the workplace,
224 See Lisa Belkin, To Keep a Child Safe, Just.. . , N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at WK4;
see also Keeping America's Children Safe: Preventing Childhood Injury: Hearing of the S.
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 110th Cong. 5-10 (2008) (statement of Ileana
Arias, Director, Nat'l Ctr. for Injury Prevention & Control) (discussing significant threats
to the health and well being of children).
225 See Gunnar B. Stickler et al., Parents' Worries About Children Compared to Actual
Risks, 30 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 522, 526-27 (1991) (noting that 72% of parents worry
about their child being abducted); see also JAMES R. KINCAID, EROTIC INNOCENCE: THE
CULTURE OF CHILD MOLESTING 180-85 (1998) (discussing the unjustified focus on child
kidnapping committed by strangers).
226 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973) (discussing the availability
heuristic as one reason for individuals' misperceptions of future probabilities).
227 The vast majority of perpetrators are male. See FINKELHOR ET AL., supra note 216, at
2 ("[Ninety-five percent of] sexual assault victims were assaulted by a male.").
228 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1187
(1994) ("The dichotomy of 'separate spheres' always has been illusory. The state deter-
mines what counts as private and what forms of intimacy are entitled to public recognition.
Policies governing tax, welfare, childcare, family, and workplace issues heavily influence
personal relationships.").
229 See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Future of Feminist Liberalism, in THE SUBJECT OF
CARE: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON DEPENDENCY 186, 199 (Eva Feder Kittay & Ellen K.
Feder eds., 2002).
230 See, e.g., Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families: Membership, Loving
and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 280-82 (1992) (arguing that it is not possible for the
state to be neutral about the definition of family because such definitions are necessary for
the distribution of legal rights and state benefits).
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childcare, tax benefits, and even zoning destabilize presumptions of
autonomy.231
Understanding the role of performance in family law demon-
strates that there is another important way in which the public col-
lapses into the private: the performance in the home of collectively
forged meanings of family and familial roles. In one sense, family pri-
vacy reflects the idea that the home is the back of the performance-a
literal and conceptual space where families interact away from an
outside audience. Indeed, families do save some behavior for the sup-
posedly private sphere of the back. Think of an irate mother hissing at
a child misbehaving in a grocery store, "just wait until we get
home." 232
But in reality, the front permeates the back. For some families,
the private home is not a back because the family must still perform
for outsiders, such as a child welfare caseworker conducting a home
visit. More fundamentally, the front and back collapse for all families
because individuals bring societal expectations of family and familial
roles into the back. For example, much of motherhood may be per-
formed behind closed doors, but a woman does not perform mother-
hood on a blank slate. Instead, she plays out collective meanings of
this role, consciously and unconsciously juggling images of mother-
hood largely brought home to her through the iterated performances
she sees in numerous settings, from the playground and grocery store
to television, movies, and magazines. All of these images accompany a
woman as she walks into the door of her home, ready to mother her
children. These "public" images of motherhood come into the "pri-
vate" space of the home.2 3 3 This front-into-the-back dynamic is a cru-
cial way in which the public-private distinction folds into itself.234 It is
231 See, e.g., Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women's Place: Urban Planning, Housing Design,
and Work-Family Balance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1797, 1798, 1825-39 (2007) (examining
"the role of urban planning and housing design in frustrating the effective balance of work
and family responsibilities").
232 The absence of an outside audience may encourage some family members to engage
in behavior they would not otherwise do in front of others. For example, in physically
abusive relationships, the perpetrator may verbally abuse the victim in public, but almost
always saves actual blows for the home. See Domestic Violence Awareness Handbook, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., http://www.dm.usda.gov/shmd/aware.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2013)
("The abusive man-and men are the abusers in the overwhelming majority of domestic
violence incidents-typically controls his actions, even when drunk or high, by choosing a
time and place for the assaults to take place in private and go undetected.").
233 An internalized audience also exists when behind closed doors.
234 Conversely, the back also comes into the front, with depictions of the "private"
home projected into the "public" space. Reality television shows give viewers the illusion
of peering behind the curtain, even though viewers and performers alike know the scenes
are staged. And classic family dramas are ways in which depictions of private family life are
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nearly impossible to imagine a private family, somehow shielded from
these outside influences.
Recognizing this dynamic helps explain the visceral appeal of
claims to family privacy. The home is not private in the sense of a law-
free zone, or even a performance-free zone, but family members do
conceive of it as a (relatively) audience-free zone. For families with
sufficient means to have a private space, the home is a place to relax
and take off the make-up. A mother is likely unconscious of the
images of motherhood that she brings into the home and therefore
thinks of the back as a much-needed space where she can let go. The
desire for such a space helps explain why the concept of family privacy
retains such broad appeal and why it is so politically difficult to
develop effective means of intervention. It is deeply unsettling to
realize that the cameras really are always rolling.
IV
DENATURALIZING FAMILY LAW
As an antidote to the normative narrowing and policy-distorting
effects of performative family law, this Part proposes a framework for
denaturalizing family law. As Judith Butler warns, it is not possible to
step outside the performance entirely;235 therefore, the goal is not the
impossible task of creating a denaturalized family law or avoiding
performativity altogether. Instead, the objective is to move away from
naturalized, overly constraining standards that reinscribe dominant
social fronts. 2 36 Given their deeply constitutive nature, familial per-
formances will continue to inform familial categories and the law will
play an active role in this process, ratifying some social fronts at the
expense of others. The goal is to be conscious of this dynamic and
resist its more troubling aspects.
shared with those outside the home. See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR; LEO
ToLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA (1877).
235 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
236 In other words, the real problem with family law's reliance on performance is the
emphasis on idealized performances, not on performance per se. Cf Linda H. Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1166 (1995) (arguing that society has
"core stories [that] structur[e] the interpretation of experience and provid[e] the authors
and audiences of future stories with commonly recognized plots, symbols, themes, and
characters," and that the lawyer's task in a Title VII case "is to choose a core story from
existing jurisprudence and then to construct, from the available facts, a new story that
resembles the core story as closely as possible").
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A. Decentering Dominant Performances
The critical feature of a denaturalizing framework is the effort to
decenter dominant performances, which can be accomplished in a
number of ways. This Subpart describes three such tactics.
1. Broader Social Fronts
A starting point for decentering dominant performances is recog-
nizing broader social fronts, so that no one performance takes prece-
dence over all others. One Supreme Court case addressing the family
holds some lessons in this regard. In contrast to Michael H., where the
plurality opinion failed to see its own intervention in perpetuating a
traditional social front,237 a more nuanced judicial approach to role
pluralism in familial performance could be modeled on the decision in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland.238 In that case, the Court struck
down a local housing ordinance that had inscribed the traditional
social front of family by limiting occupancy to single families. 239 The
family at issue consisted of a grandmother, one of her children, and
two of her grandchildren, who were cousins, not siblings-a configura-
tion not allowed by the ordinance. 240
The plurality opinion began by noting that constitutional protec-
tion for families should not be limited to a narrow conception of the
family. Instead, it was important to examine a broader tradition of
family patterns, including extended families.241 Justice Brennan, in a
concurrence, highlighted a role for the courts in promoting pluralism.
He emphasized that the Constitution does not allow the government
to impose "white suburbia's preference in patterns of family living" on
the rest of society, especially in light of the long history of low-income
families coming together to pool their resources. 242
Unlike the judicial enforcement of the dominant social front of
marriage in Michael H., courts should take a cue from Moore and
recognize multiple social fronts. The opinions in Moore do not speak
in performativity terms, but they evince awareness of the value of not
hewing too closely to one social front of family. The opinions denatu-
ralize the category of family by decentering any one performance and
237 See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
238 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
239 See id. at 505-06.
240 See id. at 495-96.
241 See id. at 504 ("Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds
uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and
especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.").
242 Id. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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instead relying on a plurality of performances that reflected multiple
lived experiences. In this way, Moore is a model not for abandoning
performance altogether, but rather for allowing multiple perform-
ances to define familial categories.
In light of family law's typical resistance to recognizing intersec-
tional performances, 243 Moore is all the more remarkable for recog-
nizing different family forms and acknowledging the historical
contingency of these forms. The case demonstrates that it is possible
for the legal system to expand, rather than constrict, the relevant
social fronts of familial categories, decentering any one performance
and furthering the goal of pluralism.
2. Alternative Means to Define the Family
In addition to broadening the type of performances that count,
another way to decenter dominant performances is to develop defini-
tions of family and familial roles that are somewhat less reliant on
performance. To do so, family law would give far greater leeway to
parties to decide for themselves whether they constitute a family. A
state could develop numerous opt-in familial categories that would
allow individuals and groups to determine whether to assume familial
rights and responsibilities by registering for one of the categories.244
To see how this might work in practice, consider the example of a
lesbian couple choosing to raise a child together but with the addi-
tional help of a man who donated sperm informally.245 Under the cur-
rent approach to nontraditional families, which insists on only two
parents, if the lesbian couple involves the man too much, they risk
undermining the parental claims of the non-biological mother because
a court would see the family as consisting of the two biological
parents.
By contrast, an opt-in approach with numerous categories of
"family" would allow the three adults to register their family form. If
they chose to be a family, then the law would treat them as such. This
kind of opt-in regime is loosely analogous to the civil contracts that
gay and lesbian couples use to construct legal relationships in the
absence of formal recognition.246 The opt-in registry, however, would
243 See supra Part II.B.2.
244 See Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REv. 573 (2013) (discussing
such proposals and offering an alternative, registered contractual relationships, which
would allow couples to choose their own level and type of commitment and then register
that commitment with the state).
245 See John Bowe, Gay Donor or Gay Dad?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, at E68
(describing several such situations).
246 See, e.g., Craig M. Fowler, New Issues and Strategies in Texas Family Law Cases, in
STRATEGIES FOR FAMILY LAW IN TEXAS 55, 58 (2012) (describing how same-sex couples in
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confer the same benefits on all types of families, not elevating one
family form over another. A traditional nuclear family would be a
legal "family" just as a three-parent family would be a legal "family."
An opt-in regime with multiple categories would thus decenter
the importance of any one social front and also would side-step the
intrusive judicial scrutiny that accompanies a court's determination of
whether a functional family meets the dominant social front. It would
thus ensure that all families receive the advantage of the hands-off
approach the state takes to formal families.
Of course there are numerous obstacles to be addressed, such as
the limits, if any, on the different types of family forms, as well as the
question of shared parental rights,247 issues that are beyond the scope
of this Article. Moreover, the process for defining the opt-in catego-
ries would, itself, likely rely on performances, as legislators determine
the range of familial groupings that would be allowed. But this kind of
reliance on performance is somewhat less troubling as it does not sub-
ject any one family to scrutiny, and also serves the broader interest of
furthering pluralism by recognizing the inherent variety of contempo-
rary family life.
A different way to define familial categories more broadly is to
condition legal recognition on the subjective nature of the bond
between the individuals, not the objective markers of conformity with
the social front of traditional families. This is not to say that the state
should grant legal recognition to any relationship, however loose, but
rather that the relevant legal inquiry should be into the closeness of
the relationship between partners or between children and caregivers.
It is the texture of these relationships that should matter, not the simi-
larity to familiar social fronts.
Consider how this might work in the judicial context. A court
would still examine performance-indeed, there may be little else on
which to rely-but the court would do so with a different eye. Instead
of comparing the performance of the would-be family member with a
dominant social front, the court would seek to understand this family
on its own terms. If the family felt strongly about Arbor Day but not
Mother's Day, for example, the question is whether the would-be
parent was included in the celebration of Arbor Day. This unlikely
Texas, which does not permit such couples to marry, use private contracts to "set out the
various rights, duties, and financial provisions pertaining to the couple's relationship-i.e.,
who owns what property, and whether there will be any children, whether they will be
adopted or conceived by artificial insemination, and what the parental rights of each
partner will be").
247 See Clare Huntington, Parents as Hubs, 94 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 45, 46-47 (2008)
(describing the problems with multiple adults claiming legal rights to a child).
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example highlights the individual nature of families; after all, it may
well be that for some family Arbor Day is the highpoint of the year.
But when a court looks only at what other families do, and asks
whether this family performs similarly, it misses the point of this
family. To be sure, this kind of inquiry may be challenging institution-
ally.248 Neither legislatures nor courts are particularly well equipped
to make these sorts of judgments. But the alternative of relying on the
prevailing social front is even more unsatisfying.
3. Rejecting Command Performances
Divorce law is one area where family law has largely rejected
command performances. Before the 1970s, every state required a
party seeking a divorce to show that the other party had committed
fault, such as adultery or cruelty. 249 But by the middle of the twentieth
century, fault-based divorce proceedings had become a charade, with
litigants, lawyers, and judges all engaging in Kabuki theater. The lim-
ited bases for divorce, combined with the need for evidence, led to
many fabricated claims of adultery.250 For example, lawyers would
arrange for the wife, a private investigator, and a process server to
find the husband in a motel room with a scantily clad woman.251 This
cottage industry led to newspaper articles, such as the famous 1934
series in the New York Mirror, entitled "I Was the 'Unknown Blonde'
in 100 New York Divorces!" 2 5 2 The ensuing court proceeding would
unfold according to a literal script, with the lawyers reading from a
mimeographed list of questions and the clerk of court interrupting the
lawyer if he deviated from the script.253
The move away from fault-based divorce was motivated, at least
in part, by the recognition that divorce proceedings had become a
248 See Goldberg, supra note 171 (discussing the reluctance of courts to engage in this
kind of analysis).
249 See generally J. HERBIE DIFoNzo, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND
LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1997).
250 See NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN
THE UNITED STATES 192-94 (1962) (providing examples of collusion between spouses to
satisfy the requirements of fault-based divorce); ALISON CLARKE-STEWART & CORNELIA
BRENTANO, DIVORCE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 9 (2006) (describing collusion not
only between spouses but also among lawyers and trial judges to circumvent the strict
requirements of fault-based divorce); DIFoNzo, supra note 249, at 9 (explaining that, while
statutes and appellate courts continued to try "to reduce the realm of fault in an effort to
slow divorce," trial courts "adopted a ministerial role" and, "[p]residing over charades of
fault, trial judges usually acted as registrars ratifying divorce plans worked out by the
parties").
251 DIFoNzo, supra note 249, at 89.
252 BLAKE, supra note 250, at 193.
253 See id.
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sham, sullying the reputation of all involved. 254 With the introduction
of no-fault divorce, every state now allows parties to obtain a divorce
without engaging in this charade.255 The standard in many states-
"irretrievable breakdown" of the marriage 256-Would seem to invite
judicial scrutiny of the marital performance, but in practice, divorces
are generally granted on one party's demand. 257 This reform is an
excellent example of how family law can transition away from per-
formance demands. 258
But other areas of family law-notably the child welfare
system-still rely on set scripts that reinforce dominant images of the
family. Child welfare proceedings in family court have been described
as harried stages:
In many jurisdictions, particularly those in large urban areas, the
courts are overwhelmed by the size of their caseloads: Overtaxed
judges hear "lists" of up to 100 cases a day, giving each case a max-
imum of five minutes. Families are sworn in en masse at the bar of
the court, with little sense that what they say to the judge thereafter
constitutes sworn testimony, rather than a free-for-all conversation.
Judges bark at the parties, calling parents "Mom" or "Dad," rather
than by their names. Orders typically are entered without any artic-
ulation of findings of fact, conclusions of law, or even a recitation of
the relevant legal standards in justification. 259
To prepare for these proceedings, parents are counseled about
how to act before the court, the attorney for the child, and representa-
tives of the social services agency. Indeed, a recent trend has been to
assign a parent in the child welfare system a "parent peer advocate"
254 See id. at 216 (describing such a recognition in New York).
255 IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 267 (5th ed.
2010).
256 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-51 (2009); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.170 (LexisNexis
2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-107 (2011).
257 See, e.g., ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 255, at 272-74 (describing the absence of mean-
ingful judicial inquiry into the breakdown of the marriage).
258 This is not to valorize divorce law. Related areas of the law, such as child custody
decisions, often involve command performances. For example, when custody is contested,
many state courts will engage an expert, called a forensic evaluator in some states, N.Y.
FAM. CT. Acr § 251 (McKinney 2009), and a child and family investigator in others, CoLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-116.5 (2011), to make a recommendation about custody. Parents are
then required to perform parenthood for this expert, who sits in judgment about who is the
better parent. Leslie Eaton, For Arbiters in Custody Battles, Wide Power and Little
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at Al; see also Katie Allison Granju, Losing Custody
of My Hope, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, at ST9 (describing a personal experience of needing
to prove to the custody evaluator that she was a "good mother"). This exacting scrutiny of
non-intact families echoes a central theme of this Article-that traditional families are
insulated from many performance demands, at least in degree if not in kind.
259 Emily Buss, Parents' Rights and Parents Wronged, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 431, 434-35
(1996).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
644 [Vol. 88:589
STAGING THE FAMILY
who is, in some senses, an acting coach, advising the parent how to
behave in front of the judge, lawyers, and social workers.260
Allowing a judge-who is quite likely to come from a different
socioeconomic background than the vast majority of the families in
the child welfare system261-to critique the performance of the fami-
lies is deeply troubling, and reminiscent of the judgments of the
nineteenth-century child savers.262 Moreover, the judicially driven
system puts performance in its worst, most reductionist light. The pro-
cess, with its rote roles and easy generalities, is not an effective inquiry
into the dispositive question of whether a child is safe at home.
A far more meaningful process would engage parents in a
problem-solving approach to the family's well being.263 For example,
family group conferencing has proven particularly effective at both
keeping children safe and ensuring that parents address the real
problems in their lives that led to the abuse or neglect at issue.264
Family group conferencing, a form of restorative justice is a legal pro-
cess for resolving child welfare cases without relying on a family court
judge as the decisionmaker. After a report of child abuse or neglect
has been substantiated, the state convenes immediate and extended
family members and other important people in the child's life, such as
teachers or religious leaders. This group works together to decide how
to protect the child and support the parents. Professionals repre-
senting the state organize the meeting and share information, but only
the family and community members actually sit down to devise the
plan for protecting the child and addressing the issues facing the par-
ents that led to the abuse and neglect. After the conference, partici-
pants and the state work together to support the family and ensure the
child remains safe.
Family group conferencing is far from scripted, and parents are
not processed like extras, nor held to a dominant social front that may
not accord with their community standards. Instead, each group's
engagement is unique and is tailored to a family's particular needs and
circumstances. A family group conference is an excellent means for
260 See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE ORGANIZING PROJECT ET AL., THE SURVIVAL GUIDE TO
THE NYC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM: A WORKBOOK FOR PARENTS BY PARENTS 25-32
(2007), available at http://www.cwop.org/documents/survivalguide2007english.pdf (advising
parents how to act in front of investigating social workers). The concern is not with parents
advising other parents, but rather that the system demands a certain performance.
261 See supra note 190 (providing sources describing race and class biases in the child
welfare system).
262 See supra text accompanying notes 187-90.
263 See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637,
674-95 (2006) (arguing in favor of a problem-solving approach to child welfare).
264 See id. at 680-85 (describing this process and the question of cost).
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doing so because it assumes that parents, and those around them, are
experts in their own lives and thus are well positioned to devise a solu-
tion for the problems facing a particular family. As one advocate of
family group conferencing has explained, "[tihe relationships between
all the parties, and out of which the problems have arisen, are so
numerous and ever-changing, and so interconnected that it is folly to
believe that outsiders to those relationships could ever 'know' them in
a way that permits either accurate prediction or predictable interven-
tion."265 Instead, the parties are in the best position to do So. 2 6 6
Rather than rote performance and reductive role playing, an alterna-
tive process can recognize individuation and see beyond a set drama.
B. Denaturalization in Practice
To illustrate the benefits of the denaturalizing framework, this
Subpart briefly sketches two examples: resolving the marriage
equality debate without ratifying any particular social front, and
developing more responsive policies to address family violence.
1. Marriage Equality
As Part III argued, the debate over marriage equality is so con-
tentious largely because both sides are vying for definitional control of
the social front of marriage. When courts and legislatures decide
whether to permit same-sex couples to marry,267 they are, in effect,
weighing in on the proper social front of marriage. A truly pluralistic
family law would decide this important question without unduly deni-
grating or devaluing any particular social front. A denaturalizing
framework shows how to do so.
In the courts,268 one reason why the cultural and political battle
has been exacerbated and not tempered is because, when extending
265 Rupert Ross, Searching for the Roots of Conferencing, in FAMILY GROUP
CONFERENCING: NEw DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNITY-CENTERED CHILD AND FAMILY
PRACTICE 5, 13 (Gale Burford & Joe Hudson eds., 2000).
266 See id.
267 Courts were the first legal actors to extend the right to marry to same-sex couples.
See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003). More
recently state legislatures have acted to recognize marriage equality. See, e.g., Marriage
Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Laws 749 (codified at N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 10-a (McKinney
2011)); Act of Feb. 8, 2012, 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 199 (concerning civil marriage and
domestic partnerships). Changes to state marriage laws have also come from ballot initia-
tives, where individuals are voting directly on the social front of marriage. See, e.g.,
CHARLES E. SUMMERS, JR., MAINE CITIZEN's GUIDE TO THE REFERENDUM ELECTION 3
(2012), available at http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elecl2012/CITIZENS%20GUIDE.pdf.
The focus of this Subpart, however, is on state actors and institutions, not individual voters.
268 As this Article is going to press, two marriage equality cases are pending before the
U.S. Supreme Court. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
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the right to marry, some courts have relied on the substantive due
process argument that marriage is a fundamental right that cannot be
denied to same-sex couples. 269 The problem with a substantive due
process analysis is that it invites an inquiry into the history and tradi-
tion of the claimed right.270 By engaging in this kind of analysis, courts
are explicitly determining the proper social front of marriage, ele-
vating one front at the expense of another.
It is hardly surprising, then, that when courts decide that history
and tradition weigh in favor of extending marriage to same-sex
couples, social conservatives are offended and raise charges of judicial
activism. 271 Indeed, the two most visible state court decisions, which
both relied on substantive due process, led to immediate political
backlash. The 2003 decision by the high court in Massachusetts was
the precipitating factor in the rash of laws and constitutional amend-
ments passed in 2004 limiting marriage to one man and one woman. 272
And the successful Proposition 8 campaign in California in November
2008 was a reaction against the California Supreme Court's decision
earlier that year to open marriage to same-sex couples.273
Adopting a denaturalizing framework would allow a court to
resolve the question of marriage equality without engaging in the
dubious practice of choosing between contested social fronts. The
denaturalizing framework begins with the proposition that marriage is
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-144); United States v. Windsor, 699
F.3d 169 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-307).
269 See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 426 (Cal.
2008). But see Windsor, 699 F.3d at 180-85 (applying an Equal Protection analysis to a
challenge of the Defense of Marriage Act); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d
407, 425-31 (Conn. 2008) (using an equal protection analysis to find Connecticut's limita-
tion of marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the state's constitution).
270 See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959 ("Whether and whom to marry, how to
express sexual intimacy, and whether and how to establish a family-these are among the
most basic of every individual's liberty and due process rights.").
271 See Adam Nagourney, California Ban on Gay Unions Is Struck Down, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2012, at Al (quoting Mitt Romney as saying, after the announcement of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Perry v. Brown, that the decision by "unelected judges" was an attack
on "traditional marriage"). Consider the official website for 2012 presidential candidate
Newt Gingrich. Under a tab entitled "Protecting Life and Religious Liberty and Standing
Up to Activist Judges" is a white paper stating that "[j]udicial solutions don't solve conten-
tious social issues once and for all, especially when they are manufactured without regard
to any constitutional basis." Bringing the Courts Back Under the Constitution, NEw-r 2012,
http://www.newt.org/sites/newt.org/files/Courts.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
272 See Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality
Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1187-89 (2009) (describing the reac-
tion to Goodridge, including the actions taken by more than half the states to ensure same-
sex couples could not marry within the state).
273 See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1067 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-144) (describing the history of
Proposition 8).
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performative. Marriage is entrenched as an opposite-sex institution
only because iterated performances have created this particular social
front. It has no greater claim as a natural category than any other
social front.
The next step in a denaturalizing approach is to ask whether laws
based on the dominant social front are impermissibly discriminatory.
As a matter of institutional competence, courts are much better suited
to the task of evaluating claims of equality and discrimination than
choosing between contested social fronts. Moreover, there are consid-
erable symbolic and substantive advantages to an equality analysis.
Symbolically, an equal protection analysis acknowledges the stakes at
play for both advocates and opponents of same-sex marriage, but does
not denigrate or elevate claims for tradition-that is, the dominant
social front-in the process of upholding individual rights. Under an
equality analysis, a court can arrive at a basis for supporting the right
for same-sex couples to marry without explicitly choosing one social
front over another, thus disparaging social conservatives who feel that
their own public conception of marriage is threatened.
Substantively, arguments based on equality sound in principles at
the heart of the American legal system and therefore may be more
persuasive than claims based on tradition. Indeed, one of the most
resonant arguments in the marriage equality movement has been the
comparison of domestic partnership regimes to racial "separate but
equal" laws.274 These arguments immediately and intuitively illustrate
how restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples is discriminatory.
Admittedly, an equality analysis is not free from dominant per-
formance demands. Equal protection analysis will require a court to
identify the classification-limiting marriage licenses to opposite-sex
couples-and then inquire into the state justification for this
274 See, e.g., Governor Christine Gregoire, Marriage Equality Speech (Jan. 4, 2012) (on
file with the New York University Law Review) ("While I understand the experiences of
racial minorities and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Americans are not identical,
laws that keep some Americans in a separate status are inherently unjust."). This is not to
argue that the analogy is uncomplicated. See R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v.
Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CAL. L. REV. 839,
866-69 (2008) ("[A]dvocates have injected the case into a protracted and often virulent
debate about the utility and appropriateness-from a constitutional as well as a historical
perspective-of drawing an analogy between antimiscegenation laws and same-sex mar-
riage restrictions."); see also id. at 879-99 (arguing that the analogy obscures more than it
illuminates and that scholars and advocates should focus on the many ways "identity-based
restrictions . . . have served primarily to police and restrain expressions of identity and,
ultimately, the range of possibilities for human intimacy" (footnotes omitted)).
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classification. Regardless of the level of scrutiny,2 7 5 the judicial inquiry
will focus on the nature of marriage for same-sex and opposite-sex
couples, asking why the state can allow it for one group but not the
other. The benchmark for marriage will likely still be heterosexual
performance of commitment. Marriage equality advocates (for under-
standable strategic reasons) will advance plaintiffs who act just like
long-term married couples, and courts will focus on the similarities
and differences between the groups-a performance-based inquiry.
But in an equality analysis the court is not overtly choosing
between social fronts. The court is not saying that marriage is tradi-
tional or marriage is more plural. Instead, a court would be espousing
a thinner notion of marriage-that whatever its essential nature, it
cannot be denied to a couple based on sexual orientation. In this way,
the court is not defining the proper social front of marriage, but
instead is determining the permissible grounds for state classifica-
tions. 276 The result will be the same, and social conservatives will
likely still feel a strong sense of loss, but the rationale for the
loss-that equality demands equal access, not that marriage is
X-respects pluralist values while still upholding the Constitution.
If it is a legislature rather than a court deciding whether to extend
marriage to same-sex couples, then a similar analysis would apply. A
legislature may be better positioned institutionally to decide between
contested social fronts, but given the strong views on the subject, a bill
would likely garner greater support, and would risk less backlash, if
the legislature used the denaturalizing framework to justify the new
law. As described above, the framework moves the debate away from
what is "natural," and instead focuses on the constitutional protec-
tions due all members of our society. In other words, this approach
recognizes what is lost for social conservatives, but explains why this
loss is necessary.
2. Family Violence
A denaturalizing framework for family law would open the door
to a different policy response to family violence. An essential first step
is for policymakers to address the tendency of both the public and
policymakers to focus on more positive images of the family while
blinding themselves to the darker side of familial interaction. It is
important to unsettle the belief that family members do not abuse
275 See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180-85 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 133
S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-307) (holding that classifications based on sexual orientation are
subject to intermediate scrutiny).
276 See id. at 185-88 (applying intermediate scrutiny to the Defense of Marriage Act
without analyzing the meaning of marriage).
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their own children. Although some of this work has been done for
physical violence between adults and between parents and children, 277
child sexual abuse remains a glaring hole, where the collective resis-
tance to seeing family members as abusers continues to skew policy.
Policymakers also must address the uneven, intersectional nature of
this selective blindness, as embodied in the particularly strong resis-
tance to viewing White, middle class, heterosexual family members as
perpetrators. Policymakers thus must portray all families as potential
sites for child sexual abuse. 278
There is a role for legal scholars as well, as contributors to an
ongoing dialogue about family violence and the role of family privacy.
A robust response to child sexual abuse will almost certainly entail
some governmental involvement in the lives of families, even if only
through public service announcements and educational programs in
schools. In the current political climate, such seemingly innocuous
efforts may well trigger claims of an overly interventionist state.279
Part of the resonance of these calls for family privacy is that they echo
an understanding of the home as a place to suspend the performance.
Scholars can help, then, by doing more than simply making rational
arguments about the multiple ways the state regulates the family.
Scholars must also grapple with the emotional appeal of family pri-
vacy and develop an equally resonant response.
CONCLUSION
If, as Holmes argued, "The life of the law has not been logic; it
has been experience," 280 family life is experienced in the public eye.
Iterated performances of family have a performative effect. In addi-
tion to creating social meaning, they permeate all aspects of family
law, shaping legal categories and informing broad swathes of doctrine.
277 See LEIGH GOODMARK, TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE
LAW 1-4 (2012) (describing the efforts over the last forty years to move domestic violence
into the sphere of public concern); MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 2 (2005) (describing the widespread view that children should be pro-
tected from abuse inflicted by their parents).
278 It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore specific policy changes, but for one
proposal addressing sexual abuse within the family, requiring the custodial parent to take a
class about warning signs of abuse and enroll the child in a prevention class, see Robin
Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of Female Children after
Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 298-315 (2001).
279 See, e.g., 13th Colony Patriots in Georgia, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS,
http://www.teapartypatriots.org/groups/13th-colony-patriots (last visited Mar. 12, 2013)
("[We] want government to get out of our homes, get out of our way, and get out of our
pockets!").
280 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009)
(1881).
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And yet legal and political decisionmakers continue to hew to
naturalized definitions of familial categories, at tremendod% cost to
pluralism. This normative narrowing is particularly problematic in
light of the dramatic shifts in American families, where much family-
like behavior now occurs outside the traditional legal family. If family
law is the gatekeeper of legal recognition, the price of admission has
become conformity with the dominant social front.
As this Article has demonstrated, identifying the performative
nature of family law provides scholars and lawyers with a greater
range of tools for both discerning and critiquing doctrine and
familial regulation more generally. It also provides the basis for an
alternative framework for defining familial categories and familial
roles-denaturalizing family law. It is not possible to step away from
performance entirely, but an increased awareness of the place of per-
formance is an essential step in exposing instances when legal analysis
shades into policy preference, pulling back the curtain on purportedly
neutral family law. Recognizing the omnipresence of performance
may be an unsettling prospect, but it is also a productive means for
thinking critically about how the state does and should regulate some
of the most important aspects of our lives.
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